2/1/2024–|Last updated: 1/2/202409:40 AM (Mecca time)
While the almost daily attacks launched by the Lebanese “Hezbollah” against Israel – since the outbreak of the October 7 War – have received the greatest amount of regional and international attention. To monitor whether the Lebanese-Israeli front will develop into a second battlefield, the attacks initiated by the Houthis – off the coast of Yemen; To prevent ships from reaching Israeli ports – it turned this attention to the Red Sea, which has joined the list of areas where the agency struggle is taking place between Iran and both Israel and the United States.
Although the armed groups supported by Iran in the region – such as the Houthis, Hezbollah, and the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces factions – deny that the attacks they have launched regularly against Israeli and American targets in the region since the outbreak of the war are at the behest of Tehran, the common denominator among them is that they all involve… Within the so-called resistance axis led by Tehran.
The denial of these groups and Iran that there is any coordination between them in these attacks does not, of course, deny the fact that they come as part of a collective response by the Iranian axis to the Israeli war on Gaza. This denial is also consistent with the traditional approach that Iran has followed in its relations with its allies in the region for many years, and is based on avoiding showing any direct Iranian role in shaping the military movements of its proxies.
Since the outbreak of the war, Iran has sought to deny any role in the attack launched by the Hamas movement on the settlements surrounding Gaza, but it has repeatedly warned that continuing Israeli attacks on Gaza will lead to the spread of the war throughout the Middle East.
In fact, Iran’s desire to avoid engaging in war does not contradict the attacks launched by its allies, which appear designed as a means of pressure on Israel and the United States. To stop the war on Gaza. In southern Lebanon, Hezbollah remains largely wary of engaging in a full-scale war with Israel, adhering to rules of engagement that do not lead to such an outcome.
The attacks launched by Iran’s allies in Syria and Iraq against American interests have been in place since before the war, although their frequency increased significantly after the war. But it has not yet led to a major American retaliation. Because of the consensus of both Tehran and Washington on the goal of avoiding expanding the scope of the war. Even as Houthi attacks in the Red Sea bring the risks of a regional war, the group lacks the desire, the ability, or both to cause war in a region vital to both the regional and global economies.
In addition to the effects that the Houthis seek to achieve in their attacks in the Red Sea; To raise the economic costs to Israel and the global economy due to the Gaza war, the military display of the group, Hezbollah and other armed groups in Iraq and Syria also falls within the framework of Iran’s display of its regional power.
Many US allies are still reluctant to participate in the security coalition formed in the Red Sea to stop Houthi attacks. Fear of being drawn into a regional war
The prevailing assumption – and it appears to be largely realistic – is that Iran, which is trying to balance military pressure through its proxies to stop the war on Gaza, and avoid its spread in the region, ultimately found that avoiding Hezbollah’s wider involvement in the war, encouraging the Houthis, and perhaps Their support for launching attacks in the Red Sea helps the Iranian budget.
Because the attacks launched by Hezbollah on Israel did not lead to achieving the desired goals by changing the dynamic of the war and pushing Israel and the United States to think about the risks involved in continuing the war, the extension of the confrontation to the Red Sea reflects the activation of other options for Tehran and its allies to increase pressure on Israel, and the United States.
There are other, more important reasons that explain the Iranian axis’ greater reliance on the Red Sea front than on the Lebanese front. On the one hand, Hezbollah’s widespread involvement in the war means that the war has actually become regional, and this contradicts the Iranian strategy.
Hezbollah also does not seem ready – at all – to fight a major war with Israel, given its high costs for it and for exhausted Lebanon as well. Due to the severe economic crisis he has been suffering for years. Such a war also brings existential threats to Iran’s strongest allies in the region, and increases the risks of direct Iranian involvement in the conflict.
On the other hand, heating the waters of the Red Sea actually raises the economic costs for Israel and American interests in the region, while it seems less capable of causing a regional war. On the one hand, Iran believes that these costs will push the United States and the West to focus their attention on ways to avoid the collapse of regional security. On the other hand, the Red Sea Front will not pose an existential threat to the Houthis in Yemen, similar to the case of Hezbollah, if it decides to enter the war.
It appears that Iranian calculations were largely realistic. Many US allies are still reluctant to participate in the security coalition formed in the Red Sea to stop Houthi attacks. Fear of being drawn into a regional war.
Also, the United States carrying out potential retaliatory attacks on the Houthis inside Yemen – to undermine their military ability to attack ships – will not lead to the complete removal of Houthi power or their loss of control over the territory they administer. According to this perspective, the Red Sea Front is more useful in terms of means of pressure, and less risky for Iran and its Houthi ally.
Among the basic factors that make the Red Sea front more important in the Iranian strategy in this war is the strategic geographical location of Yemen on the border of the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait, through which an estimated 40% of international maritime trade passes, and about 20% of global oil trade. Therefore, the Houthis and Iran believe that this advantage discourages the United States and the West from engaging in a long-term war in this region given its significant impacts on the global economy.
It appears that US allies in the region – such as the Gulf states and Egypt, with the exception of Bahrain, which participated in the security alliance – consider these risks greater than the potential benefits of participating in this alliance. Here another feature of the Red Sea Front emerges, which is that it demonstrated a division between the United States and its Arab allies regarding the approach to how to deal with this turbulent situation.
The two main reasons that have prevented the Gaza war from developing, so far, into a broader regional conflict are Iran’s attempt to benefit as much as possible from the war to display its regional power without the need to deepen its proxy involvement in the war, and American caution in inflaming the war to a regional level. Tehran also primarily views the strength of its allies in the region as a deterrent factor in its conflict with Israel and the United States.
Based on this, Iranian expectations from this strategy still work according to Tehran’s calculations. However, the risks of war spreading in the region will continue to increase, and the Iranian budget and American caution alone may not be enough to reduce these risks and keep them under control.
