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100 days after the Israeli war on Gaza stripAnd, within the restoration of its events and turns, facts return to the fore that still raise many questions and controversy on the Israeli scene, which is the first moment of that war on October 7, which received Israeli and international consensus as a picture of an intelligence and military failure, the circumstances and consequences of which remain mysterious. .
Months after Israeli occupation army officers boasted that the concrete used to build the border wall with the Gaza Strip was sufficient to build a highway from Gaza to Bulgaria, more than 1,500 fighters Al-Qassam Brigades The armed wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (agitation) The wall is filled with gliders, the price of which does not exceed a few hundred dollars each.
The sudden military operation led by Hamas began, and was called Al-Aqsa flood By bombing thousands of missiles on the cities surrounding the Gaza Strip, all the way to Tel Aviv, and with sirens breaking the silence of occupied Jerusalem, marking the beginning of an exceptional event in the history of Israel Extending 75 years.
According to the Al-Qassam Brigades, the instructions to its fighters were to attack the Gaza operations room and capture the largest number of occupation soldiers, but the movement says that it was surprised by the speed of the security collapse in the cities surrounding Gaza, with the scope of the attack expanding from the towns and settlements adjacent to the borders of the Strip even further.
Intelligence failure
A report by Al Jazeera – prepared on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the war on Gaza – monitors the accusations of failure of the occupation’s political and military leadership that followed that attack, the dimensions of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, and whether the Hamas movement had manipulated Israel in intelligence.
According to the New York Times, more than a year ago, the Israeli security establishment obtained a secret 40-page document called the “Jericho Wall” document, which includes a detailed plan to carry out an unprecedented attack against Israel similar to the October 7 attack, and talks about a barrage of missiles and drones, and the crossing of fighters with parachutes. Cars and on foot.
Last July (three months before the attack), a female soldier from Elite Intelligence Unit 8200 warned that military exercises conducted by Hamas on the border mimicked the attack plan mentioned in the “Jericho Wall” document, but this information was met with minimal security interest within the intelligence services. And the army.
The Modern War Institute identifies three reasons for the failure of Israeli intelligence to predict the October 7 attack: underestimating Hamas’ capabilities, establishing a belief in them that their military superiority is capable of repelling any attack, and misunderstanding Hamas’ premeditated intentions, as the Prime Minister was convinced Benjamin Netanyahu It is the same that Hamas has been completely deterred after the 2021 confrontation.
The New York Times says that the idea of Hamas carrying out an attack was so far-fetched that Israeli intelligence officials reduced eavesdropping on Hamas’ radio communications, concluding that it was a waste of time, noting that some officers and soldiers of the Gaza Division did not know they were being attacked until they entered. Hamas fighters to their bedrooms.
