A new round of negotiations on a ceasefire in Gaza was held, with expectations high before it, and then it was announced that no agreement had been reached. This repeated pattern of the US administration leading and talking about mediation efforts raises questions about its real purpose.
In the context of the last round, many believe that the main goal was to prevent or postpone Iran’s response to the assassination of Hamas’s political bureau chief, Ismail Haniyeh, on its territory, but a deeper reading of the scene may add another goal, perhaps more clearly after the confrontations between Israel and Hezbollah have intensified in recent days.
Negotiation management
Since the beginning of the negotiation process, the US administration has imposed itself as the main mediator managing the negotiation scene with both Qatar and Egypt, despite the fact that its public and official alignment with the occupation politically, militarily, security-wise and economically makes it far from being a mediator, let alone an honest mediator.
For months, American officials have been saying that they are “very close to reaching an agreement,” and that what remains are marginal details that can be quickly resolved, without achieving that. In fact, most of the time, the negotiating scene has regressed to before the existing positions after the “Israeli” side changed its negotiating position.
For many months, the US administration has also announced its rejection and/or reservations about some “Israeli” trends, such as targeting civilians or invading Rafah, without showing any reaction when the occupation crossed its assumed lines. Quite the opposite, it has repeatedly reiterated its support for its “ally Israel” against any threats it faces due to its aggression, repeatedly raising the level of its political, military and financial support.
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Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that Washington’s management of the negotiation process has always aimed to suggest that an agreement is close to being reached in order to serve its own interests related to the upcoming presidential elections, and to provide cover for the Netanyahu government in the crimes and massacres it is committing, and to reduce the level of pressure/criticism directed at it. As for the latest round, its timing suggests that it is linked to the expected response to what Tehran considered a violation of its sovereignty, a breach of its security, and an attempt to change the equations of deterrence in a way that “affects its honor.”
The last round came after the assassination of Haniyeh and the impression it raised that returning to negotiations would be difficult and late, and the unchanged position of Netanyahu and his government, and the steadfastness of Hamas and the Palestinian factions in their position and conditions, as they demanded that the mediators implement Biden’s plan “instead of going to more rounds of negotiations” that would turn into “a cover for additional massacres.”
Despite all of the above, the tripartite statement issued by the United States, Egypt and Qatar created a very positive atmosphere when it spoke of a “framework agreement that only needs to be finalized for implementation,” expressing the mediators’ readiness to present a “final proposal to settle the remaining issues related to implementation,” and suggesting a more serious position when it warned against “wasting more time” and rejected “any excuses from any party for further postponement.” It is worth noting that Netanyahu’s office participated in this deception when it spoke of sending a delegation “to put the finishing touches on the details and implement the framework agreement.”
After two days of talks, a new tripartite statement spoke of “intensive talks” to reach an agreement, describing them as “serious, constructive and conducted in a positive atmosphere,” and of an American proposal that “reduces the gaps between the two parties” and builds on “the points of agreement achieved” during the previous week in a way that “allows for rapid implementation,” foreshadowing a later meeting in Cairo.
The repeated raising of the ceiling high before the negotiation round, and the subsequent talk about proposals and future meetings, reinforce the assessment that the desired goal here is not to reach an agreement, but rather to manage the negotiation process itself, so that it remains ongoing to serve the aforementioned goals, in addition to the new goal of preventing an Iranian response. What supports this impression is that it coincided with a feverish political and diplomatic effort with Tehran undertaken by the Americans and a number of other parties to serve this purpose in direct and indirect ways, both announced and secret.
Unlimited support
However, in the regional scene, there is something that prompts us to consider other motives for this recurring pattern of negotiation, which is to provide a time – and logistical – space for the occupying state to preempt the Iranian response, and with it Hezbollah’s response to the assassination of its military leader Fouad Shukr with a major attack on Lebanon/Hezbollah primarily, and perhaps Iran will be added to it. Israel has already taken advantage of this time space and returned two days ago to strike Hezbollah’s weapons depots in eastern Lebanon, after which the pace of bombing between the two parties has increased again.
There is something unmistakable about American behavior regarding the current war in its regional dimension, not just the context of the aggression on Gaza. We refer here specifically to the intensive and accelerated American steps in the period following the assassination of Shukr and Haniyeh, during which the possibility of the confrontation expanding regionally increased, which Washington is supposed to not want and does not want the “Israeli” government to push towards.
It begins with a phone call between the two defense ministers, in which the US administration affirmed its commitment to “take every possible step to defend Israel,” a massive military buildup “to protect Israel from any threat,” including aircraft carriers, submarines, and F-22 Raptor aircraft, and an additional $3.5 billion in funding (in addition to the $26 billion Biden approved in April/ Last April), and the approval of arms sales to the occupying state worth $20 billion, including fighter jets, air-to-air missiles, ammunition and shells of various types, an approval whose importance lies in timing and value, even if the delivery is not immediate.
In this context, it is important to pay attention to the wording of the American statements, which consider any response to the assassinations as “aggression” that requires participation in the “defense” of the occupying state, as if Washington is implicitly denying that “Israel” carried out the assassination (which is at the forefront of the reasons for not officially adopting it) and/or that Tehran has the right to respond.
According to these data, it no longer matters much whether the US administration agrees with Netanyahu’s government on the need to exploit the current atmosphere to deliver a severe blow to Hezbollah and/or Iran, or whether it does not want to but will support it if the war expands, as the result is the same in both cases. Not many people disagree that if the US really wanted to stop the war, it could do so within days or hours, but it has not yet made a decision of this kind.
Preempt the response?
It should be noted that the Biden administration, in addition to supporting the occupation in all forms, has participated in deception and camouflage operations in service of his government’s agenda. The assassination of the deputy head of the Hamas political bureau, Saleh al-Arouri, in the southern suburb, came amid the withdrawal of US aircraft carriers from the eastern Mediterranean, suggesting a decline in tensions. The assassination of Fouad Shukr (also in the suburb, and in a manner that could only have been coordinated with Washington) came after assurances reached the Lebanese side that “Israel” would avoid targeting Beirut as part of what it called “its response to the Majdal Shams attack.”
There are more examples that suggest that every suggestion of a decrease in tensions or reassurances or confirmations of the US administration’s refusal to expand the confrontation in the region was part of a deception operation exploited by the occupation. Accordingly, in the current context, the matter may be part of a larger deception, especially since the size of the US military buildup in the region (in addition to other indicators such as the suspension of flights to Tel Aviv for months) suggests preparation for a long-term war.
Here, one should never underestimate the idea that all recent American efforts are not only trying to delay or cancel the response of Iran and Hezbollah, but may be seeking to provide an opportunity for Netanyahu to surprise them with a preemptive attack, specifically against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The occupation has been convinced since October 7 that it must prevent the possibility of launching a similar operation from southern Lebanon, which means that a decisive blow must be dealt to Hezbollah regardless of the situation in Gaza. It is noteworthy that this was Galant’s position the day after Operation Flood of Al-Aqsa. Just as the US administration agrees with the occupation on the need to eliminate Hamas, but differs with it on some details, it also agrees with it on the goal of eliminating Hezbollah, but may differ only on some details.
It seems that Hezbollah has become aware of this fact, as indicated by the statements of its Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, and as suggested by the escalation in its operations and successive deterrent messages. Therefore, it is safer not to fall into the trap of American “reassurances.”
In the current scenario, there is no intention or conviction on the part of the occupation to cease fire in Gaza, no real pressure on it to do so, and no signs or indications of anything similar, which means that the aggression continues and the possibilities of regional expansion are present. In these cases, whoever was quick to strike first would have the advantage.
The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera Network.
