The Arab foreign ministers meeting held in Cairo In March 2020, it was supposed to pass like other similar meetings, shrouded in monotony and limited expectations. However, the voting data in that session spoke of a new reality that revealed the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
At that meeting, Somalia’s rejection of a draft resolution submitted by Cairo to the Arab League on Renaissance Dam Ethiopia confirms its historical rights to waters NileThe Somali position was echoed in June of the same year, following the reservations of both Mogadishu andDjibouti Also this time on a clause included in a similar resolution.
This Ethiopian success in attracting Cairo’s historical allies in East Africa is a legitimate birth of the foreign policy dynamic. To Addis Ababa Its ability to build a network of interests that linked it to its neighbors, and what the Egyptian writer Fahmy Huwaidi described in an article as Egypt’s absence from Africa and its contentment with “tricking” instead of strategy.
It is enough to look, for example, at the history of interactions between Mogadishu, Addis Ababa and Cairo to explore the depth of the transformations that were taking place. A former Somali diplomat describes the relationship between his country andEthiopia That each sees the other as an “existential threat” to it, as the two countries have fought violent wars over the centuries.
In contrast, Mogadishu refrained from boycotting Cairo following the Camp David Accords, and preceded that by sending an artillery battalion to participate on the Egyptian front in the war. October 6, 1937.
The Road to the Regional Summit
In his paper on his country’s regional policy, Ethiopian peace and security expert Medhane Tadesse argues that Addis Ababa’s growing regional influence during the rule of the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (1991-2016) was based on a set of mutually reinforcing factors internally, regionally and internationally.
According to Tadesse, the Ethiopian leadership has had a vision since the 1990s that a regional geopolitical shift in their favor is economically contingent on transforming “Ethiopia from a poor disaster to a more productive country.” A country with a strong economy will be in a much better position to compete and confront the strategic threat from Egypt.
This transformation began with maintaining a relatively stable domestic political environment. Despite ethnic challenges and periodic unrest, the central government, led by leaders like Meles Zenawi, described by a former U.S. official as “one of the five smartest leaders in Africa,” was able to assert control and maintain security, providing the environment for a major economic transformation.
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This shift, which some experts describe as “one of the great stories of the 21st century,” saw Ethiopia leap from the third poorest country in the world in 2000 to one of the world’s fastest growing economies, with rates reaching 10% in some years. This was the result of heavy state investment in economic projects, particularly those related to infrastructure, which transformed the country into the most prominent economic center in the region.
In addition to the above, the Ethiopian government was able to build its armed forces from the rubble of the civil war into one of the largest armies on the African continent. Through this military force, it entered into security partnerships with Western powers to combat what was called terrorism, which qualified it to obtain economic, political and security support that made it the region’s policeman supported by the West for many years.
Ethiopia in Somalia
Regionally, Ethiopia has benefited from the collapse of the state in Somalia and the decline of its role. Eritrean Following the international sanctions and blockade on Asmara, it took the initiative to fill all these gaps with various tools through which it was able to build a network of interests that link it to its neighbors and lure them into the Ethiopian orbit in parallel with the decline and absence of the role of its most prominent opponents in the Nile Valley: Egypt, which is preoccupied with its internal crises and the repercussions of the Arab Spring in the Middle East.
In Somalia, Ethiopian forces have been the most important component of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and its successor, ATMIS, and Mogadishu finds itself in dire need of them in its war with Al-Shabaab.
Addis Ababa has also built close relations with some of the Somali federal regions, which enabled it to become a mediator between them and Mogadishu on the one hand, and also facilitated its pressure on the latter to reach some understandings on the other hand. The Ethiopian role there is still evident, as Addis Ababa did not comply with Mogadishu’s demands to close its consulates in the Puntland andSomaliland.
Ethiopia also took advantage of the water card by pressuring the Somali federal government to establish projects on the Shabelle River, which originates in the Ethiopian plateau and is – along with its twin, the Juba – the main source of life in southern Somalia.
Djibouti, the maritime lung of Ethiopia
On the other hand, Djibouti represented an alternative outlet for the huge Ethiopian market after the 1998-2000 war that led to a complete rupture between Ethiopia and Eritrea, as the port of Djibouti became a crossing for 95% of Ethiopian imports and exports, and Djibouti’s profits from this cooperation were estimated at one billion dollars annually.
As Djibouti has become Ethiopia’s maritime lung, relations between the two countries have been steadily strengthening, with Djibouti’s Doraleh port being linked to Addis Ababa by a 756-kilometre electrified railway.
The electricity interconnection project between the two countries also provides 80% of Djibouti’s electricity needs, and in 2019, an agreement was signed in the Ethiopian capital to extend a pipeline to export natural gas at a cost of $4 billion.
To address Djibouti’s suffering in providing fresh water for drinking and agriculture due to the arid desert environment, a project was launched in 2017 with the aim of pumping 100,000 cubic meters of water daily from the Somali region in Ethiopia to the Ali Sabieh region in Djibouti, where the daily pumping quantity is now estimated at 20,000 cubic meters.
From high tide to low tide
The establishment of the tripartite alliance that included Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia represented the peak of a moment of optimism in which the region seemed headed towards turning the page on past disputes and moving towards a state of economic integration and political coordination led by the Ethiopian locomotive.
This alliance formed a regional shield to protect Ethiopia, as the last threat targeting it was cut off by reconciliation with Eritrea, by which Cairo lost an advanced cat’s paw in the Ethiopian flank, as a paper by Ethiopian journalist Anwar Ibrahim indicates that the years 2013 and 2014 witnessed sabotage attempts targeting the Renaissance Dam that were launched from Eritrea.
However, subsequent developments soon led to a change in the landscape in the Horn of Africa, as the outcomes of the Tigray War (2020-2022) and the Pretoria Agreement between Addis Ababa and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front led to tension between the latter and Asmara, which considered this agreement an “American plot” targeting it.
While Ethiopian ambitions to obtain a sea outlet have led to increased tensions in relations with Asmara and fears in Djibouti, and to the outbreak of a crisis that has been escalating for months after the Ethiopian Prime Minister signed Abiy Ahmed A memorandum of understanding with the breakaway region of Somaliland, described by Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as a “direct violation of the sovereignty” of his country, expelling the Ethiopian ambassador from the country and setting the cancellation of the memorandum as a main condition for re-normalizing relations with Addis Ababa.
Egyptian return
The escalation of Egyptian diplomatic activity in the Horn of Africa region can be observed since May 2021 with the landing of the President’s plane Abdel Fattah el-Sisi On the tarmac of Djibouti airport, on the first visit by an Egyptian president to this country with a sensitive strategic location.
While many observers believe that the clouds of tension hovering over the region represent an ideal environment for an increased Egyptian presence, Somali researcher Al-Shafie Abtdon believes that the most important reasons for the Egyptian shift towards the Horn of Africa are the failure of the negotiating track with Addis Ababa to reach final understandings on the Renaissance Dam file.
In addition to the security tensions in the southern Red Sea and their repercussions on the Egyptian economy and security, they raised urgent questions for Cairo about how to deal with the new reality, as some of the Horn countries overlook Bab al-Mandab, which is the southern gateway to the Suez Canal.
In the context of the Egyptian-Ethiopian competition, Abtdon believes that part of the Egyptian move is linked to the threats that Cairo sees as potential for Addis Ababa to obtain a sea outlet and a military base in the Somaliland region, which casts a shadow over Egypt’s interests in the region and also over the movement of trade transiting the Suez Canal.
Egyptian tools
In its attempts to benefit from the new reality in the Horn of Africa, Cairo is using many tools, as diplomacy is highlighted by the mutual visits of senior officials between the two parties. Djibouti and Mogadishu were the first destinations of the new Egyptian Foreign Minister, Badr Abdel Aati.
Cairo also announced its intention to open a new building for its embassy in the Somali capital, Mogadishu, in addition to launching direct flights between the Egyptian capital and both Djibouti and Somalia.
Professor of African Studies Badr Shafei points out that Cairo has a historic opportunity to try to form a regional alliance led by it that includes Ethiopia’s neighboring countries, taking advantage of the state of tension between these countries and Addis Ababa, which began to appear with the news that circulated early this year about the increasing possibility of the formation of an Egyptian-Eritrean-Somali alliance.
While engaging in military-security partnerships with regional countries remains an option for Cairo, the cabinets of both Somalia and Egypt have approved a defense-security agreement that will allow the latter to, among other things, train Somali forces and support Somali security institutions technically and logistically.
Cairo also called for participation in the new African Union mission to support stability in Somalia, which will begin its mission next year.
In a region where alliances are characterised by rapid construction and disintegration, the effectiveness and sustainability of these Egyptian tools are linked to the existence of a clear strategy capable of attracting the countries of the Horn of Africa, balancing the tools of Ethiopian influence in the region, and competing with other international and regional powers gathered there, which the coming days will reveal.
