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A newspaper investigation reported,The New York Times“American, that The Israeli occupation army He suffered confusion, a lack of weapons, and was very poorly organized during the attack.”Al-Aqsa flood“Which it launched Al-Qassam Brigades -The military wing of the Islamic Resistance Movement (agitation)- on October 7 last year.
The report prepared by the American newspaper in cooperation with Israeli journalist Ronen Bergman, and titled “Where was the Israeli army?” revealed new testimonies about Hamas’ attack on Israeli settlements and military sites in Gaza coverAnd the way the Israeli army dealt with it.
According to the newspaper, the randomness and lack of information reached such an extent that the soldiers were forced to communicate in groups Whatsapp Temporary, relying on social media posts to gather information that would serve them in battle.
Due to the lack of communication with the “Ra’im” military base – a command headquarters Gaza band In the Israeli army – the Magellan unit resorted to videos published by Hamas on social media to understand what was going on.
One of the team leaders also ordered his soldiers in the helicopter to search for information on Telegram channels and news reports to choose targets.
Without a plan
“Perhaps the most horrific thing of all,” the newspaper quoted former and current soldiers and officers, was that the Israeli army had no plan to respond to any large-scale attack launched by Hamas. Gaza strip On Israeli territory.
She added that the Israeli army believed that Hamas could at most send a division or a very small number of divisions to enter Israel, prepare and train in the face of such a reference scenario, and not in the face of a major invasion.
According to former Southern Command General Yom Tov Samiya, there was “no proper defense preparation, no training, no equipment, and no force building for such an operation.”
“There was no defensive plan for a surprise attack of the kind we saw last October 7,” Amir Avivi, former deputy commander of the Gaza Division, added in a New York Times investigation, based on internal Israeli government documents and an examination of materials from a military database.
Meanwhile, former Chief of the National Security Staff, retired Major General Yaakov Amidror, says, “As far as I can remember, there was no such plan, because the army does not prepare itself for things that it believes are impossible.”
Confusion and chaos
From the testimonies collected by the American newspaper, the picture of confusion that prevailed that day appears again. The reserve soldiers were not prepared for rapid mobilization and deployment, and some of them described how they set off south on their own initiative.
The soldier in the Israeli reserve forces, David Ben Zion, who participated in the defense operation on his own initiative, says, “About 7 hours after the attack began, I turned to the reserve soldier who was next to me and asked him: Where is the IDF?”
Another paratrooper soldier added that he and his friends were recruited to blow up – without an official invitation – and, to save time, they left without night vision equipment or suitable jackets, stressing that he expected to see the roads full of soldiers, equipment and armored vehicles heading south, but they were empty.
A Southern Command official admitted that even at noon the officers there did not understand what was happening. They estimated that about 200 Hamas fighters had infiltrated Israel, when in reality the number was ten times higher.
The newspaper pointed out that one of the scenes of chaos that morning was Hamas taking control of the main roads and closing them, especially in the Negev Junction, which hindered the advance of the Israeli forces for several hours.
