“The Givati Brigade joined the 162nd Division as part of the expansion of the military operation in Jabalia,” This military announcement was not issued by the Israeli occupation army at the beginning of the war on Gaza, but rather more than a year after the beginning of the war, specifically the morning of the day after Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the killing of the head of the Hamas political bureau, Yahya Sinwar, in a clash in the Tal al-Sultan area in Rafah, amid astonishment. Everyone took up the man’s weapon and fought him face to face in an area that the occupation army declared a closed military zone. With his death, Sinwar dispelled the Israeli claims that he surrounded himself with dozens of prisoners deep in underground tunnels to preserve his personal safety.
Meanwhile, the announcement of the expansion of the military operation in Jabalia refutes perceptions that the martyrdom of Sinwar means the end of the aggression against Gaza. It also indicates the specificity and importance of expanding the attack on Jabalia, which was the top priority of the occupation army after the departure of Israel’s most wanted man.
Before the generals plan
Immediately after the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa flood on October 7, 2023, Netanyahu formed a war government, and Israel mobilized 360,000 reserve soldiers to join 169,000 regular soldiers in order to wage a relentless war following the collapse of the “cauterization” and “grass-mowing” approaches that It was adopted by the occupation army to deal with Gaza since Hamas took control of it in 2007, which was based on weakening the Hamas movement without destroying it with the aim of prolonging the periods between confrontations, and strengthening the division between the movement and the Palestinian Authority to evade the implementation of the Oslo Accords.
Israel launched a military operation called “Iron Swords” that achieved three main goals: eliminating Hamas’ rule in Gaza, dismantling the military capabilities of Hamas and the rest of the resistance factions in Gaza, and releasing Israeli prisoners.
In its first phase, the military campaign relied on unprecedented aerial bombardment to destroy everything related to the resistance, from government headquarters, social institutions, and even the homes of its members.
In addition to this, there is collective revenge against the population by causing massive deaths and destruction among their ranks, in conjunction with a strict siege that includes preventing water, food, fuel, and electricity from the residents of the Gaza Strip, and the demolition of the infrastructure in preparation for launching a large ground operation that only stopped temporarily in November 2023 to conclude a prisoner exchange deal. It included the introduction of humanitarian aid and fuel into northern Gaza for the first time since the beginning of the war.
Then Israel resumed its attack on the Gaza Strip in Khan Yunis and then Rafah, without announcing a timetable for the military operation or a vision for what Gaza would look like after the war.
In the face of the massive Israeli attack and the overwhelming armament difference, the Al-Qassam Brigades and the resistance factions worked within small combat groups usually consisting of two to three individuals, equipped with a limited amount of ammunition, to launch attrition attacks against the occupation forces, and to convey the message of its failure to clear the places it had previously entered, which prompted The occupation army began to carry out military operations again in areas it had previously controlled, then withdrew from them after assessing that it had dismantled the resistance groups and their infrastructure there.
Generals plan
The occupation worked to eliminate any manifestations of Hamas’ rule in Gaza, and considered that the distribution of humanitarian aid represented the most prominent manifestation of its ability to rule the Strip in times of war, so in February 2024, it allowed Arab and Western countries to begin direct airdrops of aid, but they stopped due to their limited size. Its cost is high and it causes injuries by falling on the heads of displaced people.
The occupation tried to co-opt some tribes and families to coordinate with them in bringing in and distributing aid, which it failed to do after the senior families and tribal notables stipulated coordination first with the security services in Gaza, while last March the American army began building a floating sea dock in the northern Gaza Strip, claiming to provide two million. meal a day when it was completed, but the pier practically failed and was dismantled and abandoned.
In light of the vicious cycle of launching military operations on areas in Gaza and then withdrawing from them, the re-emergence of resistance groups there, the failure to recover 101 Israeli prisoners, and the steadfastness of the population in the face of bombing, restrictions, and displacement plans, a plan came to the fore presented by General Giora Eiland, the former Israeli National Security Advisor, who He served as director of planning in the army.
Eiland’s ideas crystallized after he stated on the day of the Al-Aqsa flood in an interview with the Israeli Channel 12, saying, “When you are in a state of war with an opponent, you do not provide him with food, you do not provide him with electricity, water, or anything else, but you completely surround him.”
Eiland justified the targeting of women, children and civilians in Gaza, saying, “People must bear the decisions of their leaders, and it is enough to see the joy on their faces on the morning of October 7.”
Eiland’s ideas continued to develop until, in August 2024, he proposed a plan in an article published in Yedioth Ahronoth newspaper entitled “The next stage…imposing a siege on the northern Gaza Strip,” during which he acknowledged the failure of the Israeli army to achieve the declared goals of the war, and the failure of military pressure to force Hamas to release the prisoners.
To solve this dilemma, he called for starving the residents of northern Gaza to death – as he put it – after giving them a week’s notice to leave their areas for central and southern Gaza, and then preventing the entry of water, food, and fuel into the besieged areas.
Island estimated the number of people in the northern Gaza Strip at about 300,000 people, including about 5,000 resistance fighters.
He considered that those who would remain after that deadline would have only one of two possibilities: either death or surrender, and Island’s plan became known as the “Generals’ Plan.”
Leaks began to spread, some of which were reported by the occupation army radio last September, stating that Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Gallant had approved the operations that could be carried out in Gaza on the basis of the generals’ plan, focusing on the siege of the northern Gaza Strip, stopping humanitarian aid, and evacuating the population, and that if the plan succeeds, It can be replicated in other areas of the sector.
Starting from Jabalia
On the eve of October 7, 2024 – that is, on the first anniversary of the Al-Aqsa Flood – the occupation began a military operation in the Jabalia camp by the 162nd Division after it was transferred from the area of operations in Rafah and the Philadelphia axis.
He began implementing measures consistent with the “generals’ plan,” and claimed in the media that he was not implementing that plan and not imposing a siege on northern Gaza, according to statements by Israeli Defense Minister Gallant, in light of the Biden administration’s objection to this approach, leading up to giving a month’s deadline to the Netanyahu government via a letter. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin and Secretary of State Anthony Blinken directed it to improve the pace of bringing aid into the Gaza Strip, and to reject any forced evacuation of civilians from northern to southern Gaza. This is a long period that practically allows the implementation of the Israeli plan, and aims only to relieve the embarrassment of the United States, which wished to distance itself from the plan. It clearly violates international laws and customs of war.
On the ground, the occupation army began to impose a strict siege on northern Gaza, preventing the entry of food, water, and fuel to hospitals and water wells, in conjunction with intense bombardment on Jabalia camp, Jabalia al-Balad, Beit Lahia, and Beit Hanoun, which resulted in the martyrdom of at least about 400 Palestinians during the first half of October. / October 2024.
But in practice, we find that the occupation army did not implement the plan to its fullest, or even worse, as it did not give the residents a week to leave, and began targeting anyone moving in the streets of Jabalia, while carrying out bombing operations of homes and buildings using explosive robots to spread a state of panic among the residents.
Before the start of the current war, Jabalia camp was one of the largest camps in the Gaza Strip in terms of population and overcrowding. According to UNRWA statistics for 2023, 116 thousand people lived there in an area of 1.4 square kilometers.
It is the stronghold of the resistance in the Gaza Strip, as the spark of the first intifada began in 1987, and the names of a large number of resistance leaders emerged there, such as Imad Aql, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, and Nizar Rayyan, who in 2004 led the defense of the camp against an Israeli attack that lasted 17 days in the Battle of “Ayyam.” “Anger,” chanting, “They will not enter our camp.”
The occupation army carried out two military operations against Jabalia camp during the current war, the first with two military divisions in November 2023, and the other with a military division in May 2024, and announced its success in dismantling the resistance brigades in Jabalia.
But he quickly received specific blows, most notably the “Al-Qasaib” ambush at the end of his second military campaign, in which about 10,000 soldiers participated. In this ambush alone, 7 vehicles were destroyed, bringing the number of targeted vehicles to at least 120 vehicles, and the occupation penetrated only 5 blocks. From 12 blocks in the camp, he was unable to enter the rest of the blocks as his losses mounted.
Therefore, the Jabalia camp gained strategic importance to the occupation as one of the most prominent strongholds and fortresses of the resistance, and the success in destroying it, terrorizing and killing its residents, and pushing the rest of them to flee became a goal in itself and a model that could be easily replicated in other areas of the Gaza Strip.
Loopholes in the generals’ plan
Despite the ferocity and brutality of the attack on Jabalia, it was marred by many shortcomings that sparked criticism from within Israel itself, most notably what Udi Dekel and Tammy Kanner wrote at the Institute for National Security Studies, who pointed out that this starvation plan ignores many of the main challenges that may lead to complications. Implementing it and achieving its goals, it does not advance the broader objectives of the war, and leads to accelerating the imposition of military rule on the Gaza Strip.
In terms of recovering the prisoners, Dekel and Kaner doubt the contribution of the generals’ plan to releasing the prisoners. It may even lead to the death of a number of them, while they suffer from the loss of food and drink. They also expect a large number of the population to remain in northern Gaza, out of their refusal to live the suffering of displacement in the south of the Strip, which is crowded with displaced people.
The siege of civilians to the point of starvation will undermine what remains of Israel’s international legitimacy and make its leaders vulnerable to a new package of accusations of carrying out genocide before the International Court of Justice. It will increase the chances of the International Criminal Court issuing arrest warrants against Netanyahu and Gallant. It will also expose Washington to more pressure in light of its submission. Military aid and a political protection umbrella for Israel.
Finally – and this is the most prominent criticism – the generals’ plan does not provide political solutions that would help in forming an alternative leadership for Hamas in Gaza. Rather, it will lead – if successful – to the establishment of an Israeli military rule that will place responsibility for more than two million Palestinians on Israel, which will exacerbate the challenges. The security and economic situation facing the occupation, plunging it into a spiral of crises.
After the martyrdom of Sinwar
Israeli Knesset member Ofer Shelah argues that the history of Israeli security is full of operational successes that created a greed for more achievements, which created difficulty in stopping at the right time. He gives an example of the Israeli position after the 1967 war, which rejected diplomatic solutions and reaching understandings, which led to the 1973 war.
When applying Shelah’s argument to expand the military operation in Jabalia one day after the announcement of Sinwar’s martyrdom, we find that the occupation government seeks to exploit the momentum of what it considers “achievements” in order to create a new reality in Gaza, and this may be reinforced by escalating its military operations in Lebanon and directing a strike against Iran. With the aim of breaking the backbone of the resistance in Gaza and the axis of resistance in the region as a whole.
The assassination of Saleh Al-Arouri and Ismail Haniyeh, the killing of Yahya Sinwar, a Hamas leader, and the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah and senior Hezbollah military leaders, tempt the occupation to seek field achievements that improve its position, while Western parties see it as an opportunity to end the war with a prisoner exchange deal.
But by recalling the lessons of history, we find that Israel often loses as a result of its successes, and even gets stuck in its achievements. The siege of Beirut in 1982 and the evacuation of Yasser Arafat and the forces of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon to Tunisia did not bring security to Israel, but rather led to the establishment of Hezbollah in Lebanon, which turned into A constant nuisance to this day.
The siege and destruction of Jenin camp during the second intifada did not prevent it from becoming a major stronghold of resistance in the West Bank, as security solutions do not solve political problems, but rather exacerbate them.
The established fact is that Israel lives in a Palestinian, Arab and Islamic environment that is larger than itself.
Despite open Western support, it has not witnessed a safe decade since its inception. Indeed, today it has returned to fighting on many fronts, as if it were reliving its founding phase in 1948.
Assassinating a leader here or killing a leader there will not end the conflict, as the history of the Palestinian issue is a history of the martyrdom of leaders, starting with Izz al-Din al-Qassam, passing through Abu Jihad, Abu Ali Mustafa, Ahmed Yassin, Fathi al-Shaqaqi, and Abdul Aziz al-Rantisi, all the way to al-Arouri, Haniyeh, and al-Sanwar.
Therefore, the siege, killing and displacement of Jabalia camp or northern Gaza will not bring security to Israel any more than the killing of Sinwar will bring it.