Tribune. Twenty-two years ago, a vicious war already brought Vladimir Putin to power. Since then, war has remained one of its main tools. He used it continuously, without hesitation, during his long reign. Putin exists because of war, and prospered because of war. Let’s hope now that it’s still a war that will cause its downfall.
In August 1999 Vladimir Putin, then unknown to the general public, was appointed prime minister when his predecessor refused to support a full reinvasion of Chechnya. Putin was ready, and in return for their unconditional support he let the military loose, allowing them to wash away their humiliating defeat in 1996 in blood and fire. On the night of December 31, 1999, an aged and broken Boris Yeltsin resigned, passing on the presidency as a gift to the newcomer. In March 2000, after famously swearing to “kill the terrorists in the toilets”, Putin was triumphantly elected president. With the exception of four years as prime minister (2008-2012), he has ruled Russia ever since.
I returned to work in Chechnya, as a humanitarian, at the start of the second war. In February 2000, I dined in the region with Sergei Kovalev, the great Russian defender of human rights, and I asked him the question that was then on everyone’s lips: who was this new unknown president? Who was Putin? I can still quote Kovalev’s answer from memory: “You want to know who Vladimir Putin is, young man? Vladimir Putin is a KGB lieutenant colonel [les services de renseignement soviétiques]. And you know what a KGB lieutenant-colonel is? Nothing at all. »
What Kovalev meant was that a man who had never risen above that rank, who had never even been promoted to colonel, was a mere low-profile agent, unable to think strategically, unable to plan. more than a step ahead. And if it is true that Putin, in twenty-two years in power, has grown immensely in stature and experience, I think the late Kovalev was basically right.
Flight forward
Putin, however, quickly proved to be a brilliant tactician, especially when it came to exploiting the weaknesses and divisions of the West. It took him years to crush the Chechens and install a satrap on his boot, but he succeeded. In 2008, four months after NATO promised a path to accession to Ukraine and Georgia, it assembled its armies for “maneuvers” on the Georgian border and invaded the country in five days, recognizing the independence of two secessionist “republics.” Western democracies protested, and did almost nothing.
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