“Leave your problems outside. Here life is divine ”. This is how the famous invocation to enjoy the nocturnal charms of interwar Berlin resounded. A phrase with special meaning beyond the musical because the German capital was for a long time, from 1933 to 1989, the world epicenter of the kind of problems that it is just impossible to leave out. Since the Wall fell, the city has radically changed and has once again been frantic night and day. In Berlin’s social, professional and artistic life there is room for excess, entertainment or the unexpected. However, as a legacy of learning that led to the double totalitarian infamy, political life maintains a sober and relatively predictable character. Not only is Germany today quite favored compared to its past, it also does so when compared to most advanced democracies, today characterized by polarization, strong support for extremist leaders, or even a taste for vaudeville.
In theory, that pattern of consensus, seriousness and moderation should facilitate the analysis of what awaits the replacement for Angela Merkel. At the same time, the conditions imposed by the institutional framework and the political culture of the Federal Republic complicate the forecasting task. To begin with, and regardless of the fact that yesterday’s elections do not make it clear whether the coalition will be chaired by Olaf Scholz or Armin Laschetse, a process is now opening to define the contents of the new Executive’s program. In Germany, the government agenda is determined by very detailed post-election agreements that can take months to negotiate.
The new chancellor will not only be conditional on strict compliance with the pact that is finally reached, but his margin of freedom when making critical decisions or questioning the public is significantly lower than that of other leading leaders. Consider that, for example, the political systems of France and the United Kingdom are designed to concentrate power in, respectively, the Elysee and Downing Street, or that the president of the United States, despite having balances and balances, has a dominance very wide reserved that is above all relevant in foreign policy. The head of government in Germany, on the other hand, has to lead a multiparty executive – which most likely means that other political forces appoint the vice chancellor and the finance or foreign ministers – he must know how to accept that the public opinion of his country is very reluctant to hyper-leadership, he cannot even presume control of his own party, he must of course include membership in the European Union in every equation and, finally, he has to deal with very important constitutional vetoes: the 16 länder, a strong bicameralism, the Bundesbank, the Constitutional Court, and so on.
Managing this extraordinary combination of counterpowers and restrictions is not easy at all and often encourages preferring the inertia of the past, the lowest common denominator, or following the polls; which were, by the way, the three evils that characterized Merkel’s early years. But, when the Chancellor manages to establish his position, something that favors the long duration in office (nine years on average since 1949) and, above all, the great objective weight that the country has in the continent and globalization, then it has many possibilities of being the western political leader capable of printing more solid and lasting actions; something that just explains Merkel’s positive balance in her final stage. Despite these accolades, your replacement does not find a placid outlook and will have to tackle enormous challenges on three levels that, following the order of languages in which the master of ceremonies greeted Cabaret, they look at Germany itself, France and the United States.
Looking to the interior, the main challenge is to overcome the pessimism regarding the future that today dominates large sectors of society and that is reflected in the gloomy demographic projections or in the difficulties to preserve coexistence in a country forced to be multicultural . Today Germany is the exception in a continent marked by the rise of anti-immigration populisms or protectionist siren songs, but it is well known that there is no guarantee of resistance against these temptations. Furthermore, and contrary to the common places that dominate abroad, the country has not managed to achieve a solid position in the two great dossiers that mark the reforms in Europe: the technological agenda – weighed down by a very deficient digital infrastructure – and the energy transition – still conditioned by the end of nuclear power plants and the controversial dependence on Russian gas.
The new chancellor will have to attend secondly to the EU and quickly deploy a constructive complicity with France, which is a sine qua non condition for the integration process to advance after the pandemic and, ideally, consolidate the financing scheme inaugurated by the Next Generation. . The Paris-Berlin axis remains key, even when it does not work or, worse still, when it gives the entire EU a wrong intellectual and political approach, as happened between 2010 and 2012. Fortunately, Emmanuel Macron and Ursula von der Leyen they are better partners than the false friends of austerity that were 10 years ago. So are the current ECB or the Government of Rome (a fundamental piece for the credibility of the South), but the good health enjoyed by Euroscepticism in France or Italy and the difficulties in indefinitely reconciling the opposing priorities of the two central banks that coexist in Frankfurt portends a complex European front.
Finally, there remains the great challenge of positioning the country in the new international order and, with it, determining the future of the transatlantic relationship in the context of the rivalry between the United States and China. Joe Biden wanted his first call from the White House to go to Merkel last January, but, significantly, she preferred not to be disturbed on her weekend break. The absolute silence on the foreign agenda during the different electoral debates and the absence of a German role in the conflict over submarines that France has faced with the Anglo-Saxons are two great elephants in the room that the chancellor will occupy as soon as he is elected. It is no longer possible to avoid the responsibility that must necessarily play in the definition of a common European foreign and security policy that deserves that name.
And Spain? What is at stake in this process? It is enough to read the three previous paragraphs to verify that there is no country today that can condition as much as Germany the program and styles called to dominate within our democracy, our more or less comfortable position as a relevant EU Member State and a leading role greatest in the world through it. So, also in Spanish, let’s welcome the new European leader. Every morning you will be presented with the sculpture of Chillida that adorns the entrance of the Federal Chancellery.
Ignacio Molina He is a professor at the UAM, a researcher at the Elcano Royal Institute and editor of the Public Agenda.