If only the whole world had watched the movie “Attack on Darfur” by American director Uwe Boll – when he depicted, with a reality camera, the way in which the “Janjaweed” militia attacks the villages and cities of Darfur, and the horrific massacres it commits during wars, including the killing of men and children and rape. For women, relentless burning of homes, animals, and everything that gives life – to make me realize the seriousness of what is happening in Sudan.
It also became clear to him precisely what is happening in Khartoum, which has been subjected for approximately nine months to unprecedented destruction and brutal attacks that have extinguished the flame of life, and this city may need many years to recover from its wounds.
Total chaos scenario
Perhaps the people of Darfur – who knew and experienced the militia war – were not surprised by what is happening now, as they inherited wisdom and believed in many popular myths.
One of these legends, of course, is “Umm Kawakiya,” meaning “Usurpation of Ki,” which is a massive chaos in which people harm each other’s blood, honor, and property. It occurs every hundred years, sometimes less than that, and is preceded by disturbing signs.
Therefore, people are motivated to fight under the pressure of tribal nervousness, in the absence of the government and political parties, but the necessarily puzzling question is: How did “Umm Kawakia” move from Darfur to Khartoum, and what are the post-war scenarios?
Before we answer these questions, or rather look forward to the future of the political process in Sudan, it is important to answer the central question that occupies the minds of most Sudanese, which is: When will the war end?
Although I think that the important question is how the war will end, that is, by fighting or by negotiation? At a time, some readings indicate that the war will end in the same way it began, suddenly and without permission, especially since the intelligence aspect of this war dominates the other aspects.
In addition, the external party that supplies the rebel movement with weapons and money has goals behind this war, and whenever its goals are achieved, or it feels the futility of what it is doing, it will necessarily stop, or it may change its approach in dealing with Sudanese affairs.
Pieces on the chessboard
The Sudanese government must have become aware of this matter, and realized that the Rapid Support Forces are merely pieces on the chessboard, being moved according to external estimates, and therefore the government began directing accusations directly against the Rapid Support’s allies abroad.
At the same time, there are also diplomatic pressures and open intelligence lines between Sudan and those countries, which may lead to understandings and results that are satisfactory for both parties, and this appears to be a game of interests that is beginning to determine its status, to be dealt with seriously.
It is important to identify the actors on the ground, those that have chosen deceptive neutrality, but at the same time are acting under the guise of stopping the war.
By active parties, I specifically mean the military forces in the areas of operations, which are: the Sudanese army on the one hand, and the Rapid Support on the other hand, and each party has allies among the civilian forces.
The Sudanese army, without a doubt, received the support of the broad Islamic movement, in addition to the national alignment that included parties with mass weight, such as: the Democratic Federal Party of origin, led by Maulana Muhammad Othman Al-Mirghani, and the Beja Congress, as well as the armed movements that signed the Juba peace. It has fighting armies, all of which are now under unified military command in the city of El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur State, including forces affiliated with Abdel Wahed Muhammad Nour.
As for the rapid support, it depends on a political incubator whose core is the Forces of Freedom and Change, and its external line is led by the resigned Prime Minister Abdullah Hamdok, although Hamdok is less enthusiastic, and is only trying to win the affection of America and its allies, and some international organizations, which are all that cares about controlling Sudan’s resources, or Rather, it prevented Russia and China from benefiting from these resources, especially gold.
Khartoum is the password
Future scenarios for Sudan are primarily related to the outcome of the conflict between these forces, and the key to this is the liberation of the capital, Khartoum.
In the event that the army triumphs over the Rapid Support Forces, which is the most likely scenario – especially after the army obtained quality weapons and the mobilization of thousands of fighters, and the cracking of the political front supporting the support, with the increasing pace of international condemnations of the violations of the Rapid Support Forces, and many breakthroughs in foreign policy, the most important of which is the end of the “UNITAMS” mission. “In Sudan, which has sided with one party over the other, in addition to the imminent determination of the fate of Rapid Support Commander Hemedti, where many indications point to the possibility of his death, this victory does not mean the complete annihilation of the Rapid Support Forces, nor even the end of the Forces of Freedom and Change.
These are forces that the President of the Sovereignty Council and Army Commander, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, do not want to disappear, but rather, by not cutting lines of communication with them, he is keen that they be present in the next stage, to balance the political playing field, and they themselves have become convinced that they will not monopolize the government again. And what is not fully comprehended, the majority of it is not left behind.
The meter beeps
As for the Islamic forces, which supported the army and fought alongside it, after the end of the war they will lay down their weapons and prepare for the elections, with new alignments and a more flexible ideological tendency. Due to its own organizational arrangements, it decided not to participate in the government during the transitional phase.
But this scenario, which will culminate in the victory of the army, requires negotiations, especially since there is rarely an endless war on the negotiating table, and it is necessary even for the arrangements for the surrender process, determining the obligations of the warring parties, ensuring the provision of financial support, and compensating those affected, and these are obstacles that are difficult to overcome. Without international guarantees and financiers, which means that a return to the Jeddah platform is possible, but in a different way this time, after the failures that accompanied the previous rounds.
Even if no one knows exactly what will happen before or after the Jeddah pulpit, then “the unexpected always happens,” according to a common French proverb that the writer André Maurois used as the title of one of his novels, especially since the chronic authoritarian problem in the land of the two Nile countries relates to the ambitions of people and tribes. And military coups.
We may also be surprised by a new Rapid Support leadership that turns against the Dagalo family and takes control of matters, at a dialogue table with another military leadership at the head of the state.
This is also not unlikely, in the midst of these quicksands. If these changes are not at the level of individuals, they will certainly affect alliances and policies, and will completely zero the timer.