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The best way to frame the public debate is not to start from our personal assumptions and self-perceptions, nor the statements of politicians and media figures, nor to provide advice in which no price is paid with our lives and the lives of our brothers; But listening to people’s voices, then crystallizing them into policies and positions. Otherwise, we will witness a number of confusing phenomena, including:
- First: Rhetorical exaggeration, where noise prevails, and realistic considerations and discussion based on verified information are absent. An interesting statistic indicates the high level of solidarity in post-war Israel. A large majority of respondents (more than 70%) stated that they were not thinking about leaving the country because of the war. This number remained stable throughout the survey period. This high percentage of commitment to remaining in Israel, despite the intense fighting, is of particular importance given the discourse that took place in Israeli society during the severe political crisis that preceded the war, when much was said about the possible direction of immigration. There is a degree of consensus in Israeli public opinion now, but this sense of consensus may be temporary.
- Second: The spread of unrealistic and hasty proposals, such as the return of the Palestinian Authority to rule Gaza, and Arab or Islamic security forces. A Palestinian majority (up to two-thirds) now sees the Authority as a burden on the Palestinian struggle, and demands its dissolution and Abbas’s resignation.
Support for armed struggle is rising, especially in the West Bank; In response to settler violence, support for the two-state solution is rising somewhat
- Third: The prevalence of exaggerations that hide the facts and dehumanize the Palestinians, when they are not portrayed as human beings – like all other human beings – who are filled with weakness, fear, and anger. This is nothing wrong with them. There are clear differences between the people of the West Bank and their brothers in Gaza in the trends of public opinion – as shown by polls – and the reason for this is the difference in contexts and the intensity of the Israeli aggression against Gaza compared to the West Bank, even though the two are of the same concern.
- Fourth: The spread of assumptions that lack scrutiny, such as: the Palestinian Authority will be welcomed with roses when it returns to ruling Gaza, and that supporting Hamas in its current fight means supporting it politically or adopting its ideology, or the “flood of Al-Aqsa” means the return of Islamists to the Arab political scene…etc.
- Fifth: A break in the relationship between cause and effect, such as that without a sufficient flow of humanitarian aid to the people of Gaza, their ability to resist forced displacement will remain, or that the escalating talk from Blinken – the US Secretary of State – about the two-state solution will turn it into a tangible reality. Four-fifths (80%) of the Palestinians stated that their insistence on achieving a Palestinian state had increased, compared to 16% who reported that their insistence had not changed or decreased. This does not mean that the current proposal is serious. The vast majority (70%) of Palestinians believe that the recent talk about a two-state solution from the United States and Western countries is not serious.
- Sixth: Not realizing the nuances and important details that define the overall picture, and through which policies are proposed and proposals are presented. The attitudes of Palestinian youth differ from those of the elderly, and the poor of Gaza differ from their rich. There are clear differences in public opinion between the West Bank and Gaza that call for contemplation and may raise concerns. At the same time, this does not mean the absence of commonalities or a unifying national position. National positions are no longer built solely on pluralism, and awareness of differences, not confiscation of them.
- Seventh: Undermining critical thinking; The latter is based on drawing detailed maps, clarifying differences, transcending conflicting dualities, and showing complex positions. Although thousands of demonstrators gathered in Tel Aviv to demand the release of hostages held by Hamas, only 10% of Israeli Jews said in an Israeli Democracy Institute poll; They will support a cessation of fighting in order to exchange hostages.
Meanwhile, 44.3% of the majority of Israeli Jews said; They want the government to negotiate the immediate release of the hostages without stopping the fighting. Among Israelis who responded to the poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute, 26.6% said that Israel should not negotiate with Hamas for the release of Israeli hostages at all.
So what are the Palestinians saying?
Widespread public support for the October 6 Hamas attack, but the vast majority deny that Hamas committed atrocities against Israeli civilians. The war increases Hamas’s popularity and significantly weakens the standing of the Palestinian Authority and its leadership. However, the majority of Palestinians still do not support Hamas. Support for armed struggle is high, especially in the West Bank. In response to settler violence, support for the two-state solution is rising somewhat. The overwhelming majority condemns the positions taken by the United States and the major European powers during the war, and expresses the belief that they have lost their moral compass.
These are the results of the poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the period between November 22 and December 2.
As for the Arab Index, the results of which were released at the beginning of this month, it tells us about the position of the Palestinians in the West Bank on the possibility of Israel causing a new Nakba. 80% of West Bank and Jerusalem respondents reported that Israel will not succeed in causing a new catastrophe for the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip, compared to 15% who believe that Israel will succeed in doing so.
In November 2023, the Awrad Institute conducted a public opinion poll among 668 Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza Strip to study their attitudes toward the war, and concluded with a number of results, most notably: 59% of Palestinian respondents in the Palestinian Authority and in Gaza expressed their great support for the flood. . There is a large gap between the residents of the Palestinian Authority (68% support) and the residents of the Gaza Strip (47% support). In response to the motives for the flood, answers included: Israeli repression and attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque (35%), Israeli occupation and settlement building (33%), and the siege of Gaza (21%).
Three directions
What do these polls tell us about the future political trends of the Palestinians?
First: the difficulty of forced displacement
This does not mean that there is no possibility of voluntary migration.
According to Arab Barometer data before the “Flood”; The vast majority of Gazans surveyed (69%) had never thought about leaving their homeland. This is a higher percentage than the population of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia who were asked the same question. (For all these countries, the latest available data comes from the 2021-2022 wave of Arab Barometer surveys.)
When they were asked – according to a poll by the Palestinian Center for Political and Survey Studies conducted last November – that is, after the flood – whether Israel would succeed in causing a second catastrophe for the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, as some Israeli ministers called for, nearly three-quarters (73%) said (83% in the West Bank and 59% in the Gaza Strip); It will not do so, and 24% (14% in the West Bank and 40% in the Gaza Strip) said; It will work.
The poll also reported that the overwhelming majority (85%; 96% in the West Bank and 70% in the Gaza Strip) believe that Israel will not succeed in expelling the residents of the Strip from it. Only 13% (3% in the West Bank and 29% in the Gaza Strip) believe it will succeed.
The differences between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are clear, and they raise concern. There are approximately a third in Gaza (29%) who see the possibility of Israel succeeding in expelling the Palestinians, unlike the West Bank, where only a small percentage (3%) see the possibility of this. West Bank residents are much more optimistic than Gazans (83% and 53%, respectively) that Gazans who left their homes during the war for safer areas will be able to return to these homes once the war stops.
Second: Arrangements for the next day
When participants in a Palestinian Center poll were asked to predict who would control the Gaza Strip the day after the end of the current war; About two-thirds (64%; 73% in the West Bank and 51% in the Gaza Strip) said; It will be Hamas; 11% chose a national unity government affiliated with the Palestinian Authority, but without President Abbas. 7% chose the Palestinian Authority with Abbas; 4% chose Israel; 3% chose one or more Arab countries; 2% chose a national unity government led by Abbas; 1% chose the United Nations.
When asked about their preferences for the party that should control the Gaza Strip after the war, 60% (75% in the West Bank and only 38% in the Gaza Strip) chose Hamas. 16% chose a national unity government for the Palestinian Authority without President Abbas. 7% chose the Palestinian Authority with Abbas; 3% chose one or more Arab countries; 3% chose a national unity government headed by Abbas, and 2% chose the Israeli army.
72% 80% (in the West Bank and 61% in the Gaza Strip) believe that Hamas will succeed in returning to power in the Gaza Strip after the war, despite Israel’s stated goal of eliminating it. 23% (15% in the West Bank and 36% in the Gaza Strip) do not believe that Hamas will succeed in this.
After the end of the war, and in the event of the unification of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the control of the Authority; Only 28% (20% in the West Bank and 39% in the Gaza Strip) will support the deployment of an Arab security force, and 70% (77% in the West Bank and 60% in the Gaza Strip) will oppose.
Despite these different preferences, However, according to the Oored poll, three-quarters of Palestinians supported the establishment of a national unity government after the war, while only 14% supported the establishment of a Hamas-led government, with a smaller percentage (8%) supporting the establishment of a Fatah-led government.
According to the Palestinian Center’s poll, dissatisfaction with the Palestinian parties increases significantly when asked about the Prime Minister of the Palestinian Authority, the President of the Palestinian Authority, the Authority itself, and Fatah. The percentage of demands to dissolve the authority has risen to nearly 60%, which is the highest percentage ever recorded in public opinion polls. The percentage of demands for Abbas’s resignation rises to about 90%, and is even higher in the West Bank. The majority of Palestinians (68%) believe that the Palestinian Authority has become a burden on the Palestinian people, and only 28% believe that it is an asset to the Palestinian people. Three months ago, a percentage of 62% said; Power is a burden, and 35% said; It’s an achievement.
Third: The position on Hamas
It contains many details. We notice a difference between the West Bank and Gaza in this regard as a result of the latter having experienced its rule of the Gaza Strip for 17 years, but at the same time – I mean the people of Gaza – they distinguish in their position towards Hamas between their support for it as a resistance movement, and their opposition to its exercise as a ruling authority in the Gaza Strip.
Hamas’s popularity increased after the “flood”, but it rose more in the West Bank than in the Gaza Strip, as they realized that one of its motives was to defend them, as was the first batch of prisoners released from the West Bank.
Hamas’ increased popularity does not necessarily mean political support or belief in its ideology. Palestinian public opinion – as well as Arab opinion – distinguishes between Hamas as a resistance movement and it being an Islamic movement with its own intellectual choices, in contrast to the position of most Arab rulers who reject both resistance and the Islamism of Hamas.
The results of the Arab Barometer poll conducted before the “flood” reveal that Gazans have little confidence in their Hamas-led government. When asked to indicate the extent of confidence they have in the Hamas authorities, a large number of participants (44%) said; They don’t trust at all; “Not a lot of trust” was the second most popular answer at 23%. Only 29% of Gazans expressed “a great deal” or “very much” confidence in their government. 72% said; There is a significant (34%) or moderate (38%) amount of corruption in Hamas-led government institutions, and a minority believed the government was taking meaningful steps to address the problem. Only 24% of survey participants said; They will vote for Haniyeh. Barghouti received the largest share of support at 32%, and Abbas received 12% – this was before the “flood.”
After October 7, the trends differed. The satisfaction rate – according to the Palestinian Center’s data – with the role of Hamas (72%; 85% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip) was the highest, followed by the role played by Yahya Al-Sinwar (69 %; 81% in the West Bank and 52% in the Gaza Strip), Ismail Haniyeh (51%; 57% in the West Bank and 43% in the Gaza Strip), Fatah (22%; 23% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip). The Palestinian Authority (14%; 10% in the West Bank and 21% in the Gaza Strip), Mahmoud Abbas (11%; 7% in the West Bank and 17% in the Gaza Strip), and Muhammad Shtayyeh (10%; 6% in the West Bank and 16% in Gaza strip).
If new presidential elections were held today and only two candidates were Mahmoud Abbas and Ismail Haniyeh, the voter turnout would reach only 53%, and among those who will participate, Abbas will receive 16% and Haniyeh 78% (compared to 58% for Haniyeh and 37% for Abbas three months ago).
In the Gaza Strip, the voting percentage for Abbas is 24% and Haniyeh is 71%, and in the West Bank, Abbas gets 10% and Haniyeh 82%. If the presidential competition is between three: Marwan Barghouti, Abbas, and Haniyeh, the participation rate rises to 71%, and among those who vote, Barghouti gets 47%, Haniyeh 43%, and Abbas 7%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti reached 49%, Haniyeh 36%, and Abbas 13%. If the presidential competition is between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the participation rate will rise to 69%, and among the voters, Barghouti will receive 51% and Haniyeh 45%. Three months ago, support for Barghouti reached 60% and Haniyeh at 37%.
According to the Oored Center poll, approximately two-thirds (65%) believe that the war is against the Palestinians as a whole and not against Hamas, while approximately one-fifth (18%) see that it is against Hamas, and 98% felt proud of their Palestinian identity after the operation, and three expected Almost quarters of Palestinians (73%) believe that the Palestinians will win, while only 14% believe that neither side will win.
These results and many others indicate that the war led to changes in the Palestinian street, strengthens Palestinian national pride, raises hopes for victory, reduces support for the two-state solution, and the political horizon has not yet been determined. Therefore, thinking about the “next day” must take into account these aspects as well; Because it may affect how Palestinians understand the issue of leadership in Gaza after the war, the position of Hamas and Fatah in it, and of course the Palestinian Authority.
