It is difficult to imagine what the Israeli Prime Minister has in mind Benjamin Netanyahu In what appears to be a decisive response to Iran. There are no limits to restrain Netanyahu in his open wars, which are not resolved in their entirety. This failure is driven by part of Netanyahu's motives to open a new front with Iran that may be the most dangerous, in addition to his desire to resolve what he considers a battle to break the “Ring of Fire.”
And since Night of Iranian missilesIn their successive meetings, Netanyahu, along with the mini-ministerial council and the security and military leaders, are preoccupied with the nature of the response, its limits, and its type. Most of the analyzes and reports that follow these deliberations state that it will be “firm and strong,” amid American efforts pushing for it to be “balanced and limited,” and between Iranian threats of a “harsh and unnatural response” to any disproportionate Israeli targeting.
Some estimates indicate that Netanyahu may go further in his response to Iran, including settling old scores with Iran Iranian nuclear program – which had previously been targeted by intelligence operations, cyber attacks, the assassination of scientists, bombings, and the seizure of files – by directly bombing nuclear facilities, but without that there are caveats, including American rejection, uncalculated risks and unexpected surprises, as well as the possible possibility of failure.
Other estimates suggest that the “safest” and symmetrical response may be to strike military bases and installations in a way that removes the burden of another Iranian response, or to target strategic facilities and installations, represented by the oil and gas industries and ports, with the aim of destroying the country’s economy and provoking internal unrest, as well as carrying out electronic attacks, targeted assassinations, and targeting Sovereignty centers. In theory, this will require a counter-response from Tehran, based on the statements and threats of Iranian leaders and officials.
Confusion of goals
Analysts point out that the delay in the Israeli response is due to the confusing calculations in choosing the target bank and the size of the strike, especially after the US President requested Joe Biden Not to attack Iranian nuclear sites and energy facilities. In theory, it is difficult for Israel to ignore the American position, at a time when an uncalculated strike could open a wide regional war.
In this context, writer Yossi Melman (Haaretz newspaper, October 6, 2024) believes that “Israeli decision-makers are confused about the targets they must strike,” especially with the contradictory American positions regarding the form, size, and repercussions of the supposed strike, despite the light. Green given to Tel Aviv.
However, the United States fears a “crazy scenario” by Benjamin Netanyahu, who disagreed with Biden and his administration in many positions and decisions over the past year and took escalatory military and political measures despite American warnings.
Analysts believe that Netanyahu may be trying to push the United States into a regional war that will mix all the cards, as he sees it as the only way to get rid of Iran and its nuclear threat, and get out of his political and military predicament.
During the current year, Netanyahu appears to have crossed all red lines, including his relationship with the United States of America, taking advantage of the heated electoral period and the weakness of President Joe Biden’s administration. He also broke the rules of deterrence and led Israel into a long war on multiple fronts – in contrast to the Israeli security theory – and homeland. The Israelis are forced to accept heavy military losses, killing and capturing dozens of soldiers, and the issue of prisoners in Gaza has become secondary, while an escalation with Iran is escalating that could lead to a regional explosion.
According to his calculations, Netanyahu believes that the arms of the “Iranian octopus” – according to his description of the “axis of resistance” – have been eliminated or weakened as a strategic threat to Israel. So a movement agitation After a full year of war on Gaza, it appears – according to his assessment – to be in a weak state, however Hezbollah After the successive strikes on its political and military leadership, and the targeting of its infrastructure, it in turn suffers – as he sees it – from severe exhaustion despite its steadfastness in the ground confrontations and the strikes that it continues to direct against Israeli settlements and cities.