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“How can a country that is rapidly moving towards reaching a population of about 150 million live in a “geography prison”!
“Ethiopia’s existence is linked to the Red Sea. Discussing the Red Sea should not be a taboo matter for Ethiopians.”
This is how Abiy Ahmed spoke in his famous and dangerous speech before Parliament last October, and although in the same speech he specified the way to reach the sea through: “Eritrea, Somalia, or Djibouti,” he surprised everyone early this year by ignoring the governments of these three countries, and going to… Signing a memorandum of understanding with the Republic of Somaliland, which is not officially recognized until now, stipulating that it obtains an area of 20 kilometers in the vicinity of the port of Berbera for a period of 50 years, in exchange for recognizing the Republic of Somaliland and obtaining a share of the Ethiopian Airlines company!
This trend raises questions about the newness of this agreement compared to the previous one, which he also signed with both Somaliland and the Emirati company DP World in March 2018, “shortly after assuming power,” according to which Addis Ababa obtained a 19% stake in the port of Berbera, compared to 51%. for Dubai, and 30% for Somaliland, in addition to developing the land road linking Ethiopian lands and the port with a length of 260 kilometers. This is the agreement that the Somaliland government canceled with Addis Ababa in June 2022; Due to the latter’s lack of commitment to developing this road.
It also raises another question – no less important than its timing – as it comes only two days after the agreement sponsored by Djibouti between Somalia and Somaliland, which stipulated the resumption of political negotiations between the two parties, with a focus on the crucial issues: “Separation or unity,” which means undermining Djibouti’s efforts, and torpedoed the idea of negotiations.
It is true that Somaliland announced last September that it would not bargain with Somalia on the issue of secession and independence, but rather would discuss with it ways to achieve that. However, this preemption also contributed to a divergence with the central government in Mogadishu, which signed with Abiy Ahmed in June 2018 an agreement that included investment His country visited four Somali seaports to attract foreign investments.
It also does not mind concluding such a deal with Addis Ababa, as it confirms Somali sovereignty over the region, especially in light of the close relations between the two sides, which were recently embodied in the renewal of the military agreement between Ethiopia and Somalia last October.
As for Djibouti and Eritrea, their initial position was to reject the agreement, considering it a potential threat to their sovereignty, as well as its economic impact on Ethiopian trade revenues that passed through these ports.
Ethiopia’s motives towards the Red Sea
It is clear that the recent agreement with Somaliland – despite the lack of information received about it – differs from the 2018 agreement in that it is a sovereign agreement, which gives Addis Ababa freedom of movement in this region, as well as the possibility of establishing a naval military base in that region, which is not far from Bab al-Mandab. The “southern entrance” to the Red Sea, and perhaps this explains why it stipulates in return the possibility of Ethiopia recognizing this internationally unrecognized state. It seems that Abiy Ahmed played on this point, exploiting at the same time the quest of Musa Bihi Abdi – the President of the Republic of Somalia whose term expired last November – to achieve any economic or political achievement that would contribute to his victory in the upcoming elections.
Internal and external motives for Ethiopia’s move towards the Red Sea
- First: Abiy Ahmed’s desire to achieve his imperial ambitions, which go beyond the borders of his landlocked country, and seeks to dominate the region as a whole. The man did not deny this imperial dream in a speech in 2018, where he stated that his mother told him when he was 7 years old that he would be the seventh emperor, divinely destined to unify and rule Ethiopia, and the number 7, from the Book of Genesis to the Book of Revelation, represents perfection.
Hence, he seeks to repeat the imperial dream of Haile Selassie, who sought in the 1940s to annex Eritrea by force in order to reach the Red Sea. He also wants to block the way for the Amhara elites who adopt the same proposal, especially in light of the state of hostility and war between him and the Amhara nationalism led by the Fano Front. “One of his allies yesterday in the face of Tigray.”
It is true that he may not pursue this dream by force as Haile Selassie did, but he does not mind using it when necessary. This is what he confirmed in a speech last October, where he pointed out that Ethiopia has “natural rights” to have direct access to the Red Sea, and if it is deprived of these “rights,” “there will be no fairness and justice, and if there is no fairness and justice… it is a matter of “Time, we will fight.”
- Second: The desire to control the five main ports in his project based on unifying the Horn of Africa as an economic bloc in which the Navy plays a prominent role. Perhaps this explains the reasons for his interest two years ago in reviving the naval force through an agreement with France, after this force was disbanded in 1996, three years after Eritrea’s independence, and his country turned into a landlocked state.
This may explain the reasons for his focus – in the first months of his assuming power – on concluding economic agreements related to ports with the countries of the Horn of Africa in the broad sense, which included an agreement with Somalia regarding 4 coastal ports on the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, and an agreement with Eritrea regarding developing a road between the two countries. It facilitates the process of the passage of goods to the port of Assab on the Red Sea, and a third agreement with Djibouti regarding the purchase of a share of the port of Djibouti, from which 95% of Ethiopia’s exports and imports enter, and a fourth agreement with Sudan regarding the exploitation of part of the port of Port Sudan on the Red Sea in the export process, and a fifth agreement. With Kenya regarding the acquisition of lands on Lamu Island in the Indian Ocean.
- Third: Reducing the fees for using the port of Djibouti, which costs the country approximately two billion dollars annually, in addition to the great international competition that Djibouti is witnessing, which has become a destination for international countries: “the United States, France, China.” Therefore, the man fears that this competition will affect his country’s trade. External.
There is another point related to the port of Djibouti, which is the possibility of cutting off the road leading to it by controlling the Afar region, which is what the Tigray Front threatened to do in the recent war, which, if it happens, means a complete paralysis of the country’s foreign trade.
- Fourth: The desire to increase foreign investments and improve economic conditions in general after the decline in the economic growth rate from 9% in 2019 to approximately 5% last year. This is a decline that was greatly affected by the Corona crisis and the Tigray war.
- Fifth: Tension in relations with Eritrea. Because of its rejection of the Pretoria Agreement, which Ethiopia signed with the Tigray Front in November 2022, to stop the war, in addition to Asmara’s reported support for the Fano Amharic Front in its recent war against the regime, in addition to the beginning of rapprochement “again” between Eritrea and the Egyptian regime.
- Sixth: Winning the love of the international community after the criticism directed at it over the Tigray war, as well as winning the love of Washington, which wants to dismantle the Eritrean-Ethiopian alliance, after Asmara turned towards both Moscow and Beijing, and threatened to give Russia a base on the Red Sea.
- Seventh: The desire to force his country to join the Red Sea Forum, which was formed in 2020, and includes 8 countries: (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Sudan, Djibouti, Eritrea, Somalia), after a previous request was rejected… so Abiy Ahmed announced in February 2022 The security of the Red Sea cannot be achieved without the participation of Ethiopia, which will preserve its strategic interests in remote regions during the next fifteen years.
He may also seek to find a foothold for his country in the alliance currently formed by the United States; To confront the Houthi attacks in Bab al-Mandab, and thus win the favor of Washington and Tel Aviv together.
Consequences of the agreement
The first reaction to the agreement came “practically” from Somalia, which considered it canceled and affecting its sovereignty, but it did not specify what the next step would be: Will it raise the matter to the African Union, whose charter rejects infringement on the national sovereignty of member states? Or will it raise the matter to the United Nations? It has also not decided whether it will go ahead with the implementation of the 2018 agreement on the four ports with Addis Ababa, or cancel it?
It is clear that the Mogadishu government will not go far from this, and perhaps these escalatory steps are aimed at reaching a new agreement with it that benefits it on the one hand, and confirms Somaliland’s dependence on it on the other hand, which is the same position it took during the Dubai ports agreement with Somaliland in 2018. She wanted the agreement to be signed with her.
In fact, the Somali reaction is governed by several considerations, most notably the difficulty of threatening to launch a war against Ethiopia, in light of Mogadishu’s preoccupation with confronting the Al-Shabaab movement. Indeed, Mogadishu relies on Addis Ababa in this confrontation through the latter’s participation in the African forces operating there, “ATMES.”
As for Djibouti and Eritrea, their initial position was to reject the agreement, considering it a potential threat to their sovereignty, as well as its economic impact on Ethiopian trade revenues that passed through these ports. Asmara may fear that the latest agreement is an attempt to revive Emperor Haile Selassie’s idea of controlling Assab, as Djibouti, in return, considers it an overthrow of its diplomatic efforts regarding Somali reconciliation.
This latest agreement may lead to the possibility of the three countries agreeing: “Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti” to form an alliance to confront Ethiopia, and we will be faced with a new bloc, which may receive support from both the United States in the cases of Somalia and Djibouti, or Russia in the case of Eritrea.
But this planned alliance depends on several factors, most notably the Ethiopian reassurances of these countries on the one hand, and the extent of support that these countries can obtain from Washington and Moscow on the other hand. There is no doubt that if this alliance occurs, Addis Ababa will witness a shift from the “zero problems” policy that Abiy Ahmed adopted when he came to power, to the policy of “unifying opponents” into one alliance. Because of the imperial dream and the desire to dominate the territory.
