Twenty-five years after the NATO summit in Madrid in 1997, European security will write a new chapter in the coming days, in the same city. To a large extent, this chapter will have to lead Europe. In short, the NATO summit in Madrid must help us Europeans take a step forward and assume our responsibilities with regard to the security of our own continent. That is the best and most necessary contribution that Europe can make to the future of NATO.
Madrid is once again the stage in which the Atlantic Alliance will make far-reaching decisions for its future. In 1997, the Madrid summit invited three former Warsaw Pact countries to join the Alliance: the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland. Today, the historical context is the opposite of what we found a quarter of a century ago. After the signing of the Founding Act between NATO and Russia and the creation of the NATO-Russia Council, Europe was facing a future of rapprochement with Russia without historical precedent. Today, little remains of that optimism.
NATO is the cornerstone of European security. For a growing number of countries, NATO is a guarantee of national security. One of the most important consequences of the war in Ukraine has been the request of Finland and Sweden to join NATO, two countries that have all the conditions to contribute very positively to the Alliance. After the recent decision of Danish citizens to join the European defense policy, the institutions that support European security are increasingly aligned.
For decades, the debate on European security has been characterized by a false opposition between Europeanists and Atlanticists, which has fueled a sterile and unproductive debate. Few today dispute the fact that we Europeans need to contribute more to the Alliance and to European security, and that we should develop the capabilities to lead in future security crises. The question is therefore how to contribute to NATO.
A strong Europe is essential to revitalize the transatlantic link. I remember very well the words of a former chief of the British Defense Staff in one of my first meetings as high representative in Brussels, who very pertinently described the direction that the transatlantic relationship should take: “A Europe that remains allied to the United States United simply by their own weakness is of very limited value.”
Strengthening the transatlantic link implies recognizing an increasingly obvious fact: the European component of this link has changed. The events of recent months have consolidated the European Union as an actor capable of responding in a coordinated and forceful way to threats to its security. The sanctions, the joint financing of the supply of arms to Ukraine and the mere idea of an energy decoupling from Russia would have been unthinkable just a few years ago.
The European response to the invasion of Ukraine, following the measures taken to deal with the economic consequences of covid-19, has confirmed that Europe is stronger in times of adversity. It is true that Putin has paved the way for Europe to unite, but given the costs that some of the measures entail for the European economy itself, the high-mindedness that European leaders have shown in the face of this aggression cannot be ignored.
The foundations for advancing in the integration of European defense have been laid, beyond the trigger that the invasion of Ukraine has meant for the subsequent development of European foreign policy. The advances in the last 20 years in the common security and defense policy, the experience in civil and military missions, the work of the European Defense Agency and the approval of the Strategic Compass place the EU in a favorable position to meet this challenge.
As for the integration of European defense policy, there are reasons to be optimistic. The predisposition of national and community public institutions to finance joint projects to strengthen the European defense sector is an essential first step. The recent turn taken by the German Government in terms of its defense policy, announcing an increase in defense spending of 100,000 million euros, double what the German Government had been spending in recent years, represents a historic opportunity to finance shared projects at European level.
The war in Ukraine has led to an unprecedented spike in military spending in Europe. EU member states have announced increases in defense spending of an additional €200 billion over the next four years. These commitments are opposed to the military spending deficit that Europe suffers. In the last 20 years, the increase in combined defense spending of the EU member states has been three times less than that of the US, 15 times less than that of Russia and 30 times less than that of China.
However, the important thing in military spending is not how much, but how. We must spend together, better and as Europeans. Joint spending on defense is more efficient and contributes to strengthening the European industrial and technological base. Following the Commission’s commitment to allocate 500 million euros for the joint purchase of weapons, Europe is heading in the right direction.
Spending more and better on defense should not accentuate our external dependencies. Europe obtains 60% of its military capabilities outside its borders. In addition, defense spending must be progressive and gradual. Otherwise, it may discourage long-term investment in a properly European defense industry. A greater strategic autonomy of European defense will not be such if it entails a greater dependence on the arms industries of third countries. The European Defense Union, to which the president of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, appealed, must not create new internal dependencies either, benefiting a few European national industries.
It is time to contribute to NATO as Europeans. The development of the EU’s common defense policy does not imply a sharing of responsibilities with regard to European security, nor is it intended to replace the vital role played by NATO. The responsibilities of the organizations that form the backbone of the transatlantic link will remain the same. What it is about is assuming them with all the capacities that we have at our disposal.
Walter Lippmann said that alliances are like chains, they are not strengthened by weak links. These valuable words from the American intellectual are, on the eve of the meeting of the members of the Atlantic Alliance at the NATO summit in Madrid, the best way to illustrate the political challenge facing the transatlantic relationship. Once the diagnosis is made, only the political will of Europeans and their representatives will be able to strengthen the security of our continent.
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