It is no coincidence that the pace of popular protests in Kazakhstan is accelerating at this particular time. Only a few months have passed since the Eurasian Economic Union summit was held with unprecedented participation. The crisis also comes at a time when gas prices have reached record numbers (two thousand dollars per thousand cubic meters of gas).
Kazakhstan represents one of the two corners of this Eurasian economic alliance, which almost dominates the market for the production and transportation of natural gas at the global level.
Whatever the hidden supporters and standing behind the popular protests in Kazakhstan, in terms of strength and timing, it represents a strong message to whom it may concern in the Kremlin, and its giant economic arm, “Gazprom”.
In this analysis, we discuss the accelerating political turmoil in Kazakhstan, and its effects on Russia in its disputes with Ukraine and its Western allies.
The Russian state suffers from weakness and “a lack of institutional agility” in dealing with thorny, complex and numerous issues at the same time. Thus, the explosive political situation in Kazakhstan coupled with its plans to destabilize with the Ukrainian neighbor and the European Union, all represent a “headache at the wrong time” for the Kremlin, regardless of who is behind it.
Restoration of the “Russian Deep State”
It is known that Russian President Vladimir Putin has restored the Russian Deep State in the noble sense of this word, that is, contrary to what the Arab media used to confuse between the concepts of the “deep state” and the authoritarian “fifth column state” that betrays the national interests of the nation in our Arab world.
In addition, Putin revived in the hearts of the Russian people, especially the philosophical and intellectual elites, the spirit of patriotism and the great nation and the “Nastalgia” of the two ancient Soviet and tsarist pasts, in particular, after his famous historic speech at the Munich Security Conference (2007). These sentiments were precisely the balm and sedative for the Russian people, which distracted from the feeling of economic suffering during the late Tsarist and Soviet regimes.
The revival of the “Russian deep state” had a clear impact on the emergence of the “state of Russian institutions” at the political levels: political with the consensus of the Duma parties on minimum national and global goals, and foreign policy in “Somolenskaya Square” led by the Russian Foreign Ministry led by Sergey Lavrov As one of the most distinguished foreign ministers in the world, the military-security service is represented by the Ministry of Defense and the State Security Service (FSB). In addition to all that, an arsenal of Russian research centers and think tanks that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union, has found due care from the Putin regime, and most of all: the research agenda that was absent during the rule of his late predecessor Boris Yeltsin.
The ‘agile destitution’ of the Russian state
The political, military, and institutional arsenal, mentioned above, has proven its worth in achieving some military goals (in Chechnya, Syria and Central Africa, with some failures in Libya) and economic (most notably the boom in gas production and control of its global supply networks).
militarily: Russia’s successes have been represented in restoring Crimea to the Russian federal entity, imposing a state of instability in the Donbass, and what we see of military buildups encircling Ukraine to the south, east and north.
economically: Russia has achieved record numbers in gas production and control of its supply networks to Europe, in addition to finding alternative supply routes: “North Stream”, “Yamal Europe” and the Turkish Stream. In addition, alternative markets in China and Japan are added.
A headache at the wrong time
Despite this, the Russian state, as described above, suffers from weakness and “a lack of institutional agility” in dealing with thorny, complex and numerous issues at the same time. Thus, the explosive political situation in Kazakhstan coupled with its plans to destabilize with the Ukrainian neighbor and the European Union, all represent a “headache at the wrong time” for the Kremlin, regardless of who is behind it.
Certainly, the Kremlin will not repeat its historical mistake when it neglected Ukraine. First, in the early 1990s, when Ukraine was and is still reluctant to ratify the CIS agreements. Second: In 2013, when former President Viktor Yanukovych failed to control Euro-Atlantic sentiments and tendencies in the institutions of government and at the social level. The result was resorting to solutions and a military confrontation that is surrounded by painful, and perhaps crippling, Western economic obstacles for the Russian economy, which is, in fact, on its knees.
With the protesters’ attack on Russia’s Bikanur space base in Kazakhstan, both the Russian and Kazakh governments were justified in making their response to the protesters so brutal that it could not be compared to the Uzbek government’s suppression of the Fergana Valley protests in 2015.
Thus, the Kremlin views the unrest in Kazakhstan as the biggest sign of the disintegration of the Eurasian alliance and the escape of Kazakhstan from the Russian orbit politically. From an economic point of view, the Kremlin sees signs of losing control over the gas market and its transportation. Added to this is the exceptional importance of the Bikanor space base.
Therefore, Kazakhstan is the mother of all battles for the Kremlin, and it will do everything in its power to save the rule of the “Nur Sultans”. The ruling regime in Kazakhstan is in a state of weakness and despair similar to what Belarus was and still is when it succumbed to the agreements of the Union State in November 2021, and it has been hesitating for more than 20 years.
Therefore, the ruling regime in Kazakhstan is ready to sign everything that would legitimize the Russian intervention, and beyond that, the Russian presence in Kazakhstan in the long term.
Scholarship for Whom It May Concern
Thus, the “Kazakh plight” represents a timely gift for Ukraine’s Western allies in their war on Russia, and an attempt to bring it to submission to the “European Third Energy Package”, and to reduce Russia’s control over the global energy market.
Politically, the EU has learned the lesson from its past mistakes. It was preoccupied with including the countries of Eastern Europe (12 countries) in its federal entity in 2007, and neglected, on the other hand, Ukraine. It has become a threat in its eastern flank, which has turned into a real threat to the unity of the European entity, which is not devoid of countries that have their own national interests with Russia. In addition to being a beneficiary of the Ukrainian state of division and perhaps its disintegration as a state.
European lessons learned
Thus, the European Union will cling to Kazakhstan as if it is one of its lungs through which it will breathe natural gas, as it is a very important source in destroying and breaking the Russian monopoly on the gas trade.
Naturally, for the Kremlin, Kazakhstan means a guarantee for Gazprom’s monopoly on natural gas transmission lines from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, which hold a significant share of Gazprom’s exports to the European Union.
The Americans are not far from the spoils
The United States is not far from the spoils. The political crisis in Kazakhstan will give it flexibility to get out of the dominance of the “Russian bear” on the decision-making in Central Asia. Thus, better conditions will be offered to the United States in achieving its post-Afghanistan agenda.
Based on the foregoing, the United States can impose its agenda or “home duties” on the Central Asian countries “individually”, and not “wholesale”, as was customary through the “Russian Contracting Company” in the Kremlin.
So, after the “Kazakh crisis”, the United States will be in a better position than it was on the day it expelled the Russians from Kyrgyzstan, by dismantling its air base at Manas International Airport in the Kyrgyz capital, Bishkek.
Consequently, the escalation of the crisis will improve the negotiating position of the United States on all levels, including the Ukrainian file, if Ukraine’s American allies have the desire to support Ukraine.
Conclusion:
- The Kazakh political crisis represents a “wrong-time headache” for the Kremlin and its economic arm, Gazprom.
- It is possible for the Kremlin to take advantage of the current crisis, and the apparent weakness of the Nur-Sultan government, to co-opt Kazakhstan completely and unfettered into its Eurasian camp not only economically but also politically. The situation of the government in Nur-Sultan is quite similar to the situation of the Belarusian government when it signed the agreements of the Union State with Russia.
- The Kazakh crisis presents a convenient opportunity for Ukraine’s Western allies to engage in an “arm-twisting battle” with Russia’s adversary in the Kremlin.
- From behind the crisis, the United States will obtain a better negotiating position before the Kremlin on the Ukrainian file, if it is “sincere” in its intentions towards supporting the Ukrainian ally.
- It is not excluded that there are fingers of Ukraine’s Western allies in the Kazakh crisis as a means of weakening the political and military positions of the Kremlin.
- The European Union and the United States have active institutions in the political work and defense of democratic values and human rights in Kazakhstan, and it is not excluded that their role is the indirect incitement of the protesters.
- The “crisis” in Kazakhstan is a powerful message to the heir elite of the Nazarbayev regime and an explicit call to get out from under the Kremlin’s mantle.
- The fall of the political system in Kazakhstan means for the Kremlin the end of the monopoly on the export of natural gas to Central Asia (Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan). It also means cutting off the Gazprom pipeline, thus weakening its ability to control the gas market and its prices.
- The crisis in Kazakhstan will prompt the Eurasian Union countries to reconsider their impulsive attitudes towards Russia in the midst of the internal turmoil inspired by the Kazakh crisis.
- Conditions improve for the United States to exert more of its support in its conflict with Russia. But this improvement in the negotiating position could be allocated by the United States to serve its goals and its “declared or hidden” agenda with Russia.