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Do not stop Russia On attempts to invest opportunities to achieve its old and renewed goal in Syriawhich is to end the rift completely between Türkiye The Syrian regime, especially after it achieved tangible progress on this path from late 2022 to the present day, represented by hosting meetings for Turkish officials and their counterparts in the Syrian regime.
The stated aim of the recent meeting between Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Nuh Yilmaz and Russian Presidential Special Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev in the capital early this August was to consult on Syria.
Russian investment in Turkish accounts
Developments on the Syrian and international scene during the past period have been an incentive for Russia to work again to give impetus to its mediation between… Damascus AndAnkaraWhere the Turkish side seeks to address the security problems coming from the Syrian border, and the chronic anxiety caused by the “Autonomous Administration” and its military wing. Syrian Democratic Forces Classified by Türkiye as the Syrian wing ofKurdistan workers' party.
To address these threats, Ankara always maintains its contacts with the Russian side, which has become influential in the SDF areas after the redeployment operation carried out by US forces in northeastern Syria, following US President Donald Trump’s announcement in October 2019 of the redeployment of his country’s forces in Syria and keeping a limited number of them near the border with Israel and around the oil fields.
This allowed Russia to establish several military points near the Turkish border, most notably the Qamishli Air Base, which the Russian Ministry of Defense announced its establishment in November 2019.
Moscow always invests in Turkish contacts with it regarding Syria to encourage normalization between Ankara and Damascus. It seems that the Russian side wants, through this approach, to block the possibility of a future escalation in Syria by bringing together Ankara, which embraces the Syrian opposition factions, and Damascus.
Also, Ankara does not hide its fears of the expansion of the war and the confusion of the cards due to the escalation in Gaza, Lebanon and the Red Sea, as Turkish officials have repeatedly warned recently of the outbreak of a new world war, and the announcement of Turkish concerns coincided with Ankara's move to eliminate as many of its problems as possible with various parties, most notably Armenia and Syria.
Türkiye has recently been sending messages confirming its desire to normalize relations with Syria, as stated by the Turkish President. Recep Tayyip Erdogan who called his Syrian counterpart Bashar al-Assad In July 2024 to hold a meeting.
As he stressed during a previous phone call with the Armenian Prime Minister, Nikol Pashinyan About his country's intention to normalize relations with Armenia as well, and it may aim to calm tensions in the country's surroundings in anticipation of the expansion of tensions on the international scene, especially with Ankara's escalation of its tone towards the Israeli war on Gaza, and the increasing political tension with Tel Aviv.
Timeline of Russian Efforts
In December 2022, Russia succeeded in hosting a meeting between Turkish officials and their Syrian counterparts at the level of defense ministers and intelligence chiefs, the first of its kind as it was held publicly between senior officials, after many unannounced security meetings. The Moscow meeting was dedicated to discussing issues of combating terrorism and terrorist organizations, and the return of Syrian refugees.
In May 2023, the meetings between Damascus and Ankara moved to the political level, and Moscow hosted a quadripartite meeting attended by the foreign ministers of Iran, Turkey, Russia and Syria, in which it was agreed to assign the deputy foreign ministers to prepare a roadmap for restoring relations between Damascus and Ankara in coordination with the ministries of defense and intelligence agencies.
After the “Autonomous Administration” announced in June 2024 its intention to hold local elections in northeastern Syria, Turkish concerns increased about the possibility of establishing secession in Syria and imposing a Kurdish entity on its southern border with Syria.
Therefore, the Turkish Foreign Minister held Hakan Fidan Meeting with Putin on the sidelines of the 24th Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit, after a period that witnessed a noticeable decline in the two sides’ contacts regarding Syria. The meeting discussed mechanisms to thwart the elections that the US-backed “Autonomous Administration” intends to hold, after which Russian efforts to normalize relations between Ankara and Damascus will be renewed.
In mid-July 2024, Russian Special Envoy for the Middle East and North Africa Mikhail Bogdanov went to Damascus and met with President Assad. He discussed with him the return of relations with Ankara within an initiative that includes preserving the unity and integrity of Syrian territory, in addition to ensuring the security and safety of the Turkish border, and formulating a joint approach to combating terrorism. In return, Turkey is committed to withdrawing from Syrian territory, and work is being done to resolve the refugee and Kurdish issues.
Counter-terrorism and the Future of Turkey’s Role in Syria
Although the Syrian regime shows flexibility towards the Russian initiative, and confirms its keenness to deal positively with the various initiatives being put forward to improve relations with neighboring countries, it stipulates that relations with Ankara return to what they were before 2011 on the basis of respect for sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity, according to a statement issued by the Syrian Foreign Ministry on July 17, 2024, in response to Turkish calls for a meeting between Erdogan and Assad.
The Foreign Ministry statement also insisted on the demand for the withdrawal of Turkish forces from Syria, and for Ankara to withdraw from dealing with other non-governmental Syrian parties, indicating a clear desire to stop Turkish support for the Syrian opposition.
Turkey's response to the Syrian regime's demands came from Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who spoke at the beginning of August about the need to hold negotiations regarding the demand for the withdrawal of his country's forces from Syrian territory. He also explained that the return of refugees must first be facilitated, terrorist organizations must be destroyed, and then Turkey must withdraw its soldiers.
Fidan also pointed out the impossibility of reaching an agreement with the Syrian regime and ignoring the opposition, and stressed that Turkey encourages the start of negotiations between the two sides in order to reach a solution.
As part of Russian efforts to ensure the security and safety of the Turkish border, the Russian Reconciliation Center located at the Hmeimim base announced on August 2, 2024 that Russian forces would establish a new military base in the region. Ain al-Arab (Kobani) Belonging to the governorate Aleppo Near the Turkish border and under the control of the “SDF” forces.
Moscow also supports a return to the Astana formula, in which Iran participates alongside Russia and Turkey as guarantor states for the Syrian regime and the opposition, in the hope of completing the implementation of the understandings on Syria, which include northeastern and northwestern Syria as well.
Ankara and Moscow signed two memoranda of understanding in 2019 and 2020 regarding these areas, stipulating the fight against terrorism and the removal of terrorist organizations from the Turkish border, in addition to establishing a security corridor on both sides of the international “M4” highway that passes through Idlib Governorate. However, their implementation has been hampered by the complexities of the Syrian file, and Moscow’s inability to force the “SDF” organization to move away from the Turkish border due to the organization’s relationship with the American side and its extensive ability to maneuver in the face of Russian pressure.
For its part, Turkey views its military presence in northern Syria as the main guarantee for protecting the borders. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler confirmed during an interview with Al Jazeera Net in late July 2024 that they were able, through military operations in Syria, to (Euphrates Shield – Olive branch – Peace Spring) Prevent the creation of a “terrorist corridor” and ensure the security of their borders.
Guler confirmed their intention to establish a safe corridor on the borders with Syria and Iraq, and therefore Turkey is seeking to expand the scope of Turkish movement in Syrian territory to complete undermining the control of the “SDF” organization near the border.
On the other hand, the military deployment on the contact lines between the Syrian regime and the opposition factions in Idlib province contributed to a near-total halt in military operations, which led to a decrease in the waves of Syrian displacement towards Turkish territory. Here, another dilemma arises related to the unwillingness to withdraw from Syria without real guarantees that military operations will not be renewed in northern Syria, and thus the return of the flow of refugees towards Turkish territory.
Given the above data, it can be concluded that we are facing a long and complex path that will most likely remain stuck for a period of time in the corridors of the Turkish, Russian and Syrian purification committees that will negotiate among themselves to reach a formula that satisfies everyone, taking into account the factors influencing the path, such as the arrival of a new American administration to the White House, its position on northeastern Syria and coordination with Ankara regarding it.
