Serious Question: Who Runs the Rapid Support Forces Now? | Politics

After more than a year of war, its repercussions, effects, and changes in the Sudanese reality and the regional and international environment, an important question arises: Who runs the Rapid Support Forces (whatever the descriptions and names)?

What is the institutional reference (military command body) or (administrative hierarchy)? What is the political reference that determines options, develops positions and crystallizes visions?

Nothing is visible, and this is the most dangerous thing about it, because now it is a kidnapped gun, each according to his own whims, under the rule of (it escapes)!

Political and military employment

It is clear that the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, is not in full mental and physical fitness, whether due to the length of the battle and its circumstances or the injuries sustained by his forces. Also, Abdel Rahim Dagalo, his deputy and brother, is an international outcast, internally persecuted and unstable, and his capabilities do not enable him to deal with major strategies and multiple transfers. There is also no permanent convening of political consultations with the large number of advisors and their lack of experience, which is evident from their dialogues and proposals.

So who is the actual leader (or party) who uses this rifle to achieve his ambitions and goals?

There is continuous support in terms of money, men and equipment, diversification of weapons, supply movement, storage routes that require a lot of money and arrangements, and there is also political employment, media platforms and statements, all of which indicate that there are other parties with an interest.

Moreover, international and regional coordination and tireless diplomatic activity are greater than the capabilities of a rebel militia with a long record of documented violations and war crimes, and yet its speeches infiltrate international and UN platforms and forums… which reveals that there is an organized effort behind this.

Who is behind all this? Is there an international coalition group planning and managing this? What is its interest in continuing the crimes, violations, genocide and ethnic cleansing, and what are its goals in dipping its hand into this madness?

Has the war turned into serving the interests of the Dagalo family, or is it a phenomenon of panic, or an actual settlement project, or what is called the Arab diaspora?

Also, employing all of this, covering it up, and linking it to the political and civil transformation and political agreement raises many questions. It is not reasonable for conscious Sudanese political forces to agree with a militia that has committed the worst crimes in Sudanese history.

It seems that there are secrets, and there is not necessarily one goal. In times of chaos, it is easy to invest in destruction… and what an ugly choice that is!

Disintegration of the military establishment

It can now be said that the war that was planned on the morning of April 15, 2023, to be quick and fleeting, and to end with the subjugation of the Sudanese army leadership, is no longer that goal, and things have gotten out of control, but they have not moved away from the possibility of being used for various purposes.

The declared goal was to capture the army leadership according to the (agreed upon plan) between Volker, Hemedti, and FFC, and force them to follow the path of the (framework agreement), and before that, completely disintegrate the military institution.

All of this brings us back to reconsider, once again, the search for those who have an interest in causing this destruction, without blinking an eye.

The truth is that the Rapid Support Forces have now been hijacked and are being used according to multiple interests and agendas, and therefore they are intended to remain:

• There are regional and international powers that have invested in the Rapid Support Forces as a force that can be considered an alternative base for the Sudanese army, a theory that has been circulating since the first days of change in April 2019. A regional state proposed demobilizing all Sudanese army soldiers and adopting Rapid Support soldiers instead of them, thus emptying and ending the military institution, as the high command turns into mere officers moving in a ghostly space.
• There are frequent international interests in implementing the framework agreement, especially after Volker Perthes, the former UN Secretary-General's envoy, met with Hemeti in El Geneina, and the latter quickly returned to Khartoum to announce his support for the agreement.
• There are political forces that see the Sudanese army as an obstacle to their transitions and intellectual perspectives. They have agreed with Hemeti and are still supporting him after the Addis Ababa Agreement, which is his roadmap and media platforms.
• However, there is another side to the war, namely tribal vendettas in Darfur, and social ambitions in other regions. What is happening now of the mobilization to attack Al-Fasher and before that Babanusa, Al-Geneina and Nyala, is driven by tribal motives, and now the mayors and leaders of the civil administrations are leading the mobilization, and in the rest of the states of Sudan the matter is not without that, as is happening now in Sennar and Ad-Damazin.

The militia's gun has become a (tool) that each party brandishes as it pleases, and each party disavows its actions, while the party that is equivalent to all of that is the Sudanese people who paid the price for these adventures and maneuvers, and they are the ones who have the right to determine their outcome.