On Monday night, the Israeli army began a ground operation that it said was “limited” against Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. The operation was announced – before it was carried out – with unprecedented arrogance in military confrontations, which usually must be characterized by secrecy. To ensure the availability of the condition of surprise, and the consequent confusion of the “enemy” and paralyzing his ability to recover from the expected chaos, of course.
The Israelis and Americans spoke “insolently” about the operation, and even specified its place and time as if they were going for a picnic and not to war!
The media and celebratory uproar over the operation, in both Tel Aviv and Washington, was provocative and insulting at the same time, as if Netanyahu had obtained a “certificate of guarantee” of victory without painful compensation. This is the arrogance that the Israelis usually showed in previous cases, in which the Arabs were defeated for one reason or another.
In some of its details, the scene seemed like an opportunity to re-wash Netanyahu’s reputation, which the fighters in Gaza are constantly manipulating, on the one hand, and to recycle the army’s prestige, which it lost in Gaza as well, on the other hand.
The Israeli Prime Minister did not learn from the accumulation of expertise and experience with the hot and tense areas of contact…with the “ring of fire and blood”: the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and with Lebanon, of course. It's what we can all depend on—as has been proven after 1982, 1987, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2014, and 2021, and will soon be proven again,” says Gina Abercrombie-Winstanley, non-resident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative. – It is that the Israeli army will not be able to maintain the country’s security, and in fact, the essence of this conflict is Netanyahu’s rejection of the two-state solution.
New Palestinian and Lebanese youth will emerge, determined to resist and carrying weapons. She adds: The Israeli leadership must wish its people better than just stopping violence. Winning is possible, but it comes through diplomacy and regional settlement.
However, the operations of terror and shock that the Israelis took by surprise Hezbollah, while it was at the height of its confidence in its military arsenal, its security system, and its moral project as a support force for Gaza, removed all the caveats, red lines, fears, and calculations, which had always been present in the Israeli dealings with Lebanon since 2006.
The Israeli brutality in southern Lebanon was expected as a fact in which “two goats cannot butt heads.” There is no doubt that the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, on September 27, shortened what was supposed to be a long way towards restoring Israeli public opinion’s confidence in its prime minister, which It cracked in a “scandalous” manner due to the Al-Aqsa flood and its aftermath, which reinforced the opinion that the success of the assassination operation was a “personal victory” for Benjamin Netanyahu, which he himself announced in a ceremonial manner, considering the liquidation a prelude to “changing the balance of power in the region for years to come.”
Netanyahu believes that the door is now no longer just ajar, but has become fully open to add more alleged military “achievements,” instead of the “setbacks” that his political, military, and family record is full of, by encroaching on southern Lebanon, which has become, as he believes, More fragile, more confused, and more chaotic than before, through a “cautious” ground operation through which a ceasefire agreement is achieved, after which Hezbollah does not return its forces to the border and the firing of rockets and missiles stops.
Then Israel may be able to withdraw its ground forces, provided that Hezbollah remains a major force in Lebanese politics, and a “fragile peace” returns again, as happened after the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006.
This is the possible Israeli plan for the post-war period. Netanyahu is betting that it is the most important card that may secure his chance to be re-elected again, secure his political future, and protect him from imprisonment later.
Tonight's ground invasion may have been “easy” from the point of view of Hezbollah, at its most “weak”; Due to the destruction of its communications network earlier in September, by a sudden and shocking attack – unprecedented in the history of military confrontations – on its radio pagers, and after the liquidation of eight of the nine most senior military leaders in the party, and about half of its leadership council, if not Much more than half, not to mention the most senior political official who has a symbolic, central and great spiritual status (the late Hassan Nasrallah).
Despite the declared American rhetoric about the necessity of entering the realm of diplomacy instead of a military solution, the approach that has matured in the Israeli – and, of course, American – strategic mind reinforces the tendency to shift from unilateral control of the air to the “easy” seizure of territory through a ground operation.
This “approach/advice” saw that to ensure the continuation of what it considered a “tactical victory” that had certainly weakened the party, Israel must follow up in one way or another. It needs to seize the opportunity of what it described as the “chaos” that Hezbollah is experiencing. To destroy as much of the organization as possible and its arsenal, which includes 150,000 missiles, missiles, and drones.
However, the approaches do not hide in their recommendations the “bill” of ground work and its cost. It is certain that Hezbollah will be able to inflict heavy losses on the Israeli ground forces if they enter southern Lebanon with the logic of an easy picnic, not a war, especially since reports indicate that Hezbollah has a network. It has extensive tunnels in the border area, and it is a huge organization. It has up to 100,000 fighters, although American intelligence believes that their number may be closer to 40,000 or 50,000 fighters. However, this number of fighters is considered enormous.
In addition, the party is concerned with restoring its prestige in the eyes of Lebanese public opinion, consolidating its credibility as a fighting force, and not harming the legitimacy of its weapons to protect Lebanon from any possible Israeli aggression. This is a step that may be exhausting and arduous and has its cost in the Arab incubator supporting the party, but it is not difficult to overcome. Especially since the party has the tools to be able to re-establish itself, as it is a major organization and a large part of the Lebanese political scene. The coalition he leads has a bloc of more than 60 seats in the Lebanese parliament, which is not a majority, but it is important nonetheless. Then let us not forget that the party provides social services to the poor residents of southern Beirut and southern Lebanon.
Among the speculations that attracted the ground operation is the interpretation of the party’s “wisdom” and “disciplined” positions, or what is described as “cold patience” away from recklessness and emotion, as avoiding engaging in further fighting with Israel at this particular stage – if He can avoid it – and that is before he regains his health and rebuilds its alternative leadership structure again, especially since the party, even after the recent Israeli attacks, did not fire thousands of rockets, shells and drones daily into Israel, which is what it believes it is capable of doing.
In this context, there are fears that gradually began to cloud what the Israelis considered an “astonishing victory.” There have been repeated American reports indicating that Nasrallah represented a rationalist engaged in the game of geopolitics, and despite the fiery rhetoric about revenge for the aggression against civilians in Gaza, he did not launch a major attack against Israel, nor did he use the most advanced missiles in his arsenal, which includes dozens. Thousands of medium and long-range missiles.
These concerns are based on the fact that Nasrallah's ancestors grew up amid the turmoil and trauma caused by Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. After Israel assassinated Abbas al-Musawi, his wife, and his son, that liquidation was only a confirmation of Hezbollah's commitment to its mission. Nasrallah followed in Musawi's footsteps, as the group grew under his leadership in terms of recruitment, arsenal, and spread inside and outside Lebanon.
Prospective approaches to the future of Hezbollah after Nasrallah and his military and political leadership are based on the fact that the party’s legitimacy is founded on the conflict with Israel, and as long as this conflict continues – especially in light of the heavy losses suffered by civilians in Gaza and southern Lebanon – the way is open for a version of Hezbollah.” More extreme than his era with the late “moderate” Hassan Nasrallah.
The uncertainty and lack of transparency in Tel Aviv regarding the day after Nasrallah's assassination, which accompanied the boasts of the ground military adventure, may – if it gets out of control – involve the United States of America, which is busy with the elections next November, in additional crises that it does not want in the Middle East region. This made US President Joe Biden and the American leadership provide advice described in local American media as “excellent” to the Israeli government: “There is no long-term military solution to this conflict, and there must be a day after that that is trustworthy.”
It is true that Netanyahu, who has already begun to recover in the polls with each attack on Hezbollah, will strengthen his position further, but the tens of thousands of displaced Israelis in northern Israel may not return to their homes anytime soon. Hezbollah's arsenal remains well-established, and the response of the new players in Yemen and Iraq will be disappointing to Israeli hopes. Israel's strategy of targeted assassinations and ground invasion of southern Lebanon may generate impressive headlines, but it has not yet yielded impressive results.
The opinions expressed in the article do not necessarily reflect the editorial position of Al Jazeera Network.