The Law of Unintended Consequences: Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union | Public Agenda

For decades the Union based its popular legitimacy on results. It provided “the goods”: peace, prosperity. We call this “legitimacy of results”. The Romans called it “bread and circuses”. Instead, its democratic credentials, the process (“input legitimacy”) were and are woefully weak, a truth we don’t like to admit. Yes, we have a directly elected European Parliament. But when the electorate knows that their vote will decide neither who governs them (for example, the President of the Commission and of the Council) at Union level nor how they will be governed (in terms of general political orientation) it is not surprising that the Voter turnout has been steadily declining (with a small uptick in the last election). Why bother voting if my vote doesn’t significantly influence those two basic characteristics of functioning democracies? It is no wonder that “taking back control” has become the rallying cry of unprecedented Euroscepticism in a growing number of Member States.

The rule of law – the absolute foundation of the Union – has come under unprecedented strain, leading to a real gap between, as you know, Poland and Hungary and the EU. But it is too easy to point the finger at those two countries and label them as the black beasts of Europe. There have been “judicial rebellions” in Denmark, the Czech Republic and, notably, even the German Constitutional Court has opposed the Luxembourg Court of Justice.

The run-up to the Ukraine crisis has exposed the weak point of European integration: the persistent inability to convert incredible economic might into geopolitical might. This is mainly due to two reasons. First, the inability to reach unanimity on critical foreign policy issues (China, Nordstream 2, the Middle East, etc.), where on each occasion one or two member states broke ranks and prevented speaking with one voice. And secondly, you can only play the card of the soft power until a certain point. When geopolitics get tough and Adults sit at the table, the problem of soft power What we were told is precisely that: that it is soft.

If I were asked to define Europe’s fundamental security policy, I would reduce it to a painful historical truth: the American cavalry will come to the rescue, as it did twice in the last century. It is only partly for resource reasons: the combined defense spending of the Twenty-Seven (and the UK) is greater than that of Russia. Europe does not need to spend more, but simply to organize itself better – the taboo words – in a European army. And why not? Because of the ridiculous idea that defense is the core of national sovereignty and, therefore, must be jealously protected from any interference by the EU. Ridiculous? Not a single state in Europe has the capacity to defend itself against a real security threat. In reality, no State is truly sovereign in defense matters. But we have never fully recovered from the historic French veto of the creation of a European Defense Community in the early 1950s.

Finally, the tax drama. There is no political system in the world, no State of significant size, in which there is such a discrepancy between ambition and political and regulatory power and the financial resources available for its realization. The Union’s budget is minuscule. If there is no fiscal power and some significant own resources, the European emperor is naked. “Ukraine” has shaken these clichés in some fundamental respects. And while it’s hard to gauge the long-term effect, some seismic changes are likely to be irreversible.

The idea that the Union cannot and should not interfere in security matters has been shattered forever. The EU’s supply of lethal weapons to Ukraine (and three cheers for it) has shattered that taboo. I will not be surprised if at the Conference on the Future of Europe the issue of security and defense emerges as an important item on the “no-holds-barred” agenda. Macron has used the magic words: European Army.

No less dramatic in breaking this taboo is the tax issue. Europe may remain a fiscal pygmy, but the authority to borrow (anathema to fiscal hawks) and spend is already entrenched (covid plus Ukraine). Finally, in this fiscal aspect, Europe will have acquired the tool that all modern governments use: indebtedness. Borrowing is more addictive than nicotine; I wouldn’t be surprised if it becomes the medicine of choice when future budget talks get rocky.

Another myth that has collapsed has been that of the soft power. It remains to be seen whether the sanctions adopted against Russia will bring Putin to his senses. But no one can say that they are commingle. The speed and effectiveness of sanctions is largely due to the EU’s competence in areas where sanctions matter. And here we must applaud Josep Borrell who, from his first day in office as High Representative, has stated: we have great power, we just have to have the guts to use it. Europe is no longer a power Virginand it is an arsenal that can be, and most likely will be, used in other contexts as well.

It was also made clear in the urgent deliberations around the Russian invasion that in terms of foreign policy it cannot be tolerated that one or even two Member States continue to put up a fight and bring the bike down. Isn’t it time for a new Luxembourg Agreement (circa 1965) in reverse? A gentlemen’s agreement (which, like the original agreement, does not require a new Treaty wording) in which, in matters of foreign policy, the veto can only be exercised by, say, three Member States?

The problems of the rule of law and the democratic deficit will remain, make no mistake (although those who expected a “tough action” against Poland may have to put it aside for a while, before the nobility of Poland and its people by opening their borders and their hearts to what could be millions of refugees). And, unfortunately, the true democratization will also be frozen: it goes back to the legitimacy of the results (and the results are impressive).

But perhaps the most important consequence of Putin’s murderous assault has been not only a trans-European sense of identity and solidarity (the protests from Madrid to Berlin and elsewhere were not by Spaniards, or French or Germans or Poles, but by Europeans) but a rediscovery by Europe and Europeans of our fundamental values, the profound reason for being for which the Union was created.