The Shatt al-Arab is the source of historical tension in relations between Iraq and Iran, and one of the main reasons for the outbreak of war between the two countries in the eighties of the last century, as this waterway is of great strategic importance.
At the height of the events of the first Gulf War, Iran launched its major attack on the Shatt al-Arab on January 9, 1987, and besieged the city of Basra, to announce two days later its control of the Shatt before the Iraqi forces regained it later.
violent attack
The siege of Basra, which Iran called “Karbala 5” operations, and Iraq called it Operation “The Greatest Harvest,” an attack launched by the Iranian forces on their Iraqi counterparts in the Basra sector, with the aim of controlling this strategic city and taking full control of the Shatt al-Arab, according to the professor of modern and contemporary history, Dr. Saad Nassif. Jassim Al-Jumaily.
Al-Jumaili explains – in his speech to Al-Jazeera Net – that this battle, which lasted more than two weeks and ended on January 26, 1987, is one of the largest battles of the war between Iraq and Iran in the eighties in terms of losses and the terrible circumstances that occurred during it.
He notes that the main objective of this operation is to seize the city of Basra, which is considered a key to the Iraqi oil fields, in addition to the fact that its fall into the hands of Iran may eventually lead to the fall of the Iraqi regime in Baghdad.
Al-Jumaili adds that this battle began in the middle of the night of January 9, 1987, when the so-called Basij forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guards attacked the Iraqi defenses south of Lake Al-Asmak, and were able to control the southern channel of the lake.
Some pieces of the Iranian forces were also able to cross the lake of fish through boats, and were stationed on the side of the lake from the west, where Iran was planning to continue the attack until reaching the Shatt al-Arab, but these forces faced a violent Iraqi attack launched by the Republican Guard, and the fierce fighting resulted in Huge losses on both sides, according to Jumaili.
heavy losses
The professor of history quotes some sources that the Iraqi Air Force has lost more than 50 aircraft as a result of Iranian air defenses, and as a result of these heavy losses in Iraqi aircraft, the Iranian Air Force was able to gain air supremacy temporarily.
He continues by saying that the Iranians surprised the Iraqi forces by using the Swedish anti-armor defense systems (RBS 70), and after Iraq lost air sovereignty over the battlefield, it decided through its air force to target and bomb the means of supply and Iran’s main cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, and Qom, and Tehran responded by bombing Iraqi cities with the salvo of missiles. Land on land, and after this stage, air control returned to the Iraqi Air Force again.
After the battles of attrition that lasted for quite some time, the Iraqi Republican Guard launched an armored counterattack on January 28, 1987, with the support of helicopters and artillery, towards the Iranian forces. The Iraqi Third Corps launched another attack on the Iranian forces that were stationed west of Lake Al-Asmak.
Al-Jumaili explains that the Iraqi counterattack was in the form of pincers and led to great destruction and heavy losses incurred by Iran, but the battle was resolved by recording great losses on both sides, and according to some sources, Iran lost 65,000 soldiers, and Iraq lost 20,000 soldiers.
History of the dispute
On the roots of the historical differences between the two countries, Professor of Political Geography, Dr. Hussein Qasim Al-Yasiri, says that the problem of the Shatt Al-Arab is not a new one, as many tensions occurred because of it, and the first agreements between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavid Empire were around it.
Al-Yasiri explains to Al-Jazeera Net that Iraq signed an agreement with Iran in 1937, and this was the first treaty to be concluded after the establishment of the Iraqi state, where the two parties agreed to organize the work of a special committee to demarcate the borders and attached some protocols to it, and this agreement stipulated that the entire Shatt al-Arab stream would be subordinate to Iraq. And under Iraqi sovereignty, except for specific areas in front of Abadan and Muhammarah (Khorramshahr), in which the border line with the deepest point is called the Taluk line.
He points out that skirmishes occurred in 1969 when the Iraqi police were exposed to Iranian fishermen, which prompted Tehran to cancel and tear up this agreement, leaving the Shatt al-Arab problem as a source of tension between the two countries.
Saddam Hussein, Houari Boumediene and Muhammad Reda Pahlavi on the sidelines of the signing of the Algiers Agreement in 1975 AD. #Iraq pic.twitter.com/w3YIpgK8xd
— Meelad_Qaseera (@Meelad_Qaseera) May 3, 2014
He adds that the two countries signed the Algiers Agreement in 1975 in exchange for Iran stopping support for the Iraqi Kurdish movement, and Baghdad recognized at the time that the border on the waterway extends along the entire bottom line river, meaning that half of the Shatt al-Arab is given to Iran.
But the agreement did not last long, as the then Iraqi President Saddam Hussein canceled it on September 17, 1980 (5 days before the outbreak of the war between the two countries) and about 5 years after signing it himself “when he was then Vice President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr” with Shah Muhammad Rida. Pahlavi, with the mediation of the late Algerian President Houari Boumediene, Thus, he returned the Shatt al-Arab under Iraqi sovereignty, but without benefiting from it because the Iranian forces remained in control of the Shatt.
Saddam returned and recognized the Algiers Agreement on the eve of his invasion of Kuwait in August 1990.
Today, the Shatt al-Arab course is no longer of great importance to both parties – according to al-Yasiri – especially since Iraq built ports on Khor Abdullah, as well as the establishment of the port of Faw, the Shatt al-Arab is no longer important to Iraq from a commercial point of view, with the exception of agriculture that is built on the Shatt al-Arab on the The western side, which was affected by low water levels as well as high salinity, but it remains a question of sovereignty.
He goes on to say: As for the Iranian side, it is still the commercial beneficiary of the Shatt al-Arab, because there are commercial ports that Tehran has built, renovated and expanded, and a free trade zone was established on the Shatt al-Arab.
geopolitical problem
For his part, Professor of Political Geography, Dr. Majid Hamid Al-Badri, believes that the issue of the Shatt Al-Arab is not only a geographic borderline, but its political dimension is greater, so this framework is very important, which should reflect the vision of the two regimes in Iran and Iraq.
And he explains – in his speech to Al Jazeera Net – that this file has a political dimension more present than the geographical, so Iran refused to specify the Shatt al-Arab because its advantage is that it is deposited on the Iraqi side, making the region shallow and deepening in the Iranian side.
Al-Badri expresses his belief that the Algiers Agreement was the difference in determining the maritime borders in the Shatt al-Arab, but it was not an end to the problems between Iraq and Iran because it is part of an unstable political situation between the two countries.
He argues that the geographical, political, economic, and also geopolitical dimension shaped the entirety of the Iraqi-Iranian relationship, which was reflected in the agreement defining Iraq’s maritime borders in the Shatt al-Arab, which is part of the political borders of this country.
Are the differences over?
For his part, political analyst Najm al-Qassab confirms that the dispute between the two countries, over the division of the Shatt al-Arab, exists so far, but it has been settled in favor of Iran.
He explained to Al Jazeera Net that the Iraqi governments, successive since 2003, were and are still complimenting the Iranian side, especially over the disputed areas, the wells, the waters and the Shatt al-Arab.
Al-Qassab expresses his belief that if there is no strong Iraqi government that thinks in the interest of the country, it is very difficult to resolve this issue and this historical and eternal dispute.