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The “Al-Aqsa Flood” battle renewed the question about the future of Islam and Islamists in the region from several angles, including:
- First: The conflict over patterns of religiosity in the region, and the profound transformations affecting it that we find in economics, politics, and social media.
- Second: The future of political Islam movements; That is, those that accepted to work within existing systems and not resort to violence in change.
Hamas was – and still is – one of the last manifestations of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region. It is true that it was able to redraw its image as a resistance movement. But the question remains: Can the Battle of “Al-Aqsa Flood” give life to these movements?
- Third: The possibility of violent extremism escalating and regaining its vitality again in light of what we are witnessing of Israeli brutality supported by Western governments, and the official Arab and popular inability to stop the massacres.
In the first axis, The Economist magazine – in its issue printed on December 2nd – asked about the impact of the war in Gaza on the ongoing “religious revolution” in the Middle East?
The features of this religiosity, which the magazine described as a revolution, were as follows:
- Sunni-Shiite rapprochement; Islamic sects began to bridge their sectarian divisions.
- Acceptance of Israel; Since 2020, four Arab countries have joined the Abraham Accords, normalizing their relations with Israel.
- Individual religiosity mixed with Sufism: Religious practice has changed from political mobilization for societal salvation – as espoused by Islamists – to a more personal and spiritual pursuit.
- Decentralization of religious scholars; “Across the Muslim world, clerics who were once shunned have been ridiculed for greed and hypocrisy in recent years,” the magazine said.
The magazine points to a number of phenomena that interact with each other: an increase in religious tolerance, a decline in religiosity among young people, a decrease in jihadist operations, and a decline in political Islam movements.
After preaching the religious revolution in a time when there were no revolutions, the magazine asks: Can you – meaning the revolution – survive the Gaza war?
The magazine presented its answer, but it was not devoid – as is the custom of many Western analyzes of religious changes in the region – of misleading simplification, which monitors separate phenomena that we do not find a connection between, and tries to reach hasty conclusions without a deeper understanding and real explanation, and celebrates – in many cases – In terms of the miraculous and the miraculous, it only includes facts, developments, etc., as it relies on terminology and proceeds from assumptions that lack accuracy and the ability to approach the phenomena as they are, and not according to the biases of the researchers.
At a time when the political connection to religion is increasing (please note that I use the word religious, not religion), from new approaches; As a result of the rise of right-wing populism, the increasing presence of identities, and the search of social groups for meaning in light of the fluidity of transformations and the absence of certainty, in light of these phenomena, Muslims are required to dismantle the connection between the religious and the political.
Religious and cultural discourses escalated in the war on the Palestinians, which neither Israeli leaders nor Western governments tried to hide from the public, such as: citing Biblical sayings to justify Zionist brutality, and the minister who came as a pilgrim to the Israeli War Council (cabinet) as a Jew, not the Secretary of State of the United States, and also a summons to the furnace. The civilizational war as it appeared in the September era, and elsewhere, as we witnessed it.
The war on Gaza and the West Bank highlighted that it was between Muslims and Jews, in clear contradiction to the reality in which a significant number of non-Zionist Jews and progressives sided with Palestinian rights, but it seemed that the stakeholders from each party wanted to push this perception forward. To rally his supporters on every side in a war that was – and still is – the truth of a people related to the right of a people to self-determination and liberate their land.
It is true that some official institutions have become silent out of consideration for the position of their governments. But the religious discourse as a whole was supportive of the Palestinian cause
The ongoing war has strengthened the connection between the political and the religious, and here is a point worth noting that the magazine did not capture, which is the ability of the younger generations – whose religiosity is increasing according to opinion polls, contrary to what the magazine indicated – to enter politics from new approaches that we are not familiar with.
The Palestinian issue is one of these entry points that renewed their awareness of politics and increased the activation of their roles in it. Z say and alpha Through national and transnational mobilization, he introduced the issue and its roots.
This generation also helped present the Palestinian narrative to its peers, and documented Israeli violations against the Palestinians, which astonished everyone, in light of naive perceptions that globalization would eliminate any affiliation and trample any response to politics. The Palestinian issue was – and still is – able to restore politics, mobilization, and mobilization, as happened in successive Palestinian uprisings since the beginning of the current millennium, but what was new was its ability to unify the arenas of claims.
Cairo demonstrators called for life, freedom, and justice, while raising Palestinian flags. Moroccan demonstrators also objected to the education reform project, with Palestinian flags flying above them.
Characteristics of the new religiosity
The religiosity of university students – young men and women after the Arab uprisings – is of an individual nature. Its solid core is not formed by organizations, but rather by a network of interactions and a large number of initiatives. Its features are shaped on social media sites, and by practical practice, not ideological discourse. Therefore, it is in constant transformation, and is characterized by a dominant female presence.
Also, his position on politics is shaped by the contexts and their development. He is able to constantly redefine political action, and at its heart is the use of religion in political mobilization from new approaches, based mainly on the humanitarian and moral/values, not the authoritarian sectarianism.
Younger generations have the ability – which needs to be supplemented by theorizing – to present religion not as racist, pertaining to followers of a specific religion. Rather, it has a common human and values dimension with both worlds.
In contrast to this pattern of religiosity, regimes, movements, and institutions in the region push an authoritarian, exclusionary, undemocratic pattern that does not accept pluralism within itself or with others, is neoliberal on the economic level, and mixes soft power with hard power to achieve its goals, as appears in military interventions directly, or through proxies. Everyone is similar in the essence of the spirit and heart of Islam that they want to advance. Despite the conflict between them over influence and interests.
The magazine did not indicate that the alleged religious revolution arose in a discrepancy between the aspirations of the masses and the trends of authority; Despite normalization with the Zionist entity at the official level, wide sectors reject this normalization, as shown in opinion polls, so the war came to confirm this fact and make it more entrenched.
The magazine also did not indicate that the religious revolution is approved by the Sultan’s staff and not by the requirements of the call. Islamists have been excluded from the political scene in most countries in the region through repression, not politics, at a time when we are witnessing a welcome relationship with the Zionist entity.
Economic policies are being adopted in favor of narrow capitalist alliances with regional and international reach, leading to exacerbation of poverty and increasing disparities in income, opportunities and wealth.
Every carnivalesque action undertaken by the region’s ruling authorities allied with Western governments is usually welcomed without real questioning of feasibility and impact. It is worth noting that the heavy presence of women, which is greater than before in the public sphere, jobs, parties, and restaurants, may not necessarily mean greater gender equality.
The ongoing war highlighted the point of difference between the regimes and the Brotherhood movement in the region, which is the armed resistance to the Zionist entity. The first rejected it, and the second accepted it. There is almost consensus among all forms of religiosity in the Arab world regarding supporting the Palestinians, supporting the Palestinian cause, and supporting the resistance. Sufis, such as Al-Jafri and his Sheikh Bin Hafeez, agreed with the Sheikh of Al-Azhar, who led the position of religious institutions in the Arab world, alongside the Mufti of Oman and Sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayyah.
It is true that some official institutions have become silent out of consideration for the position of their governments. But the religious discourse as a whole was supportive of the Palestinian cause.
It is expected that at the heart of religiosity in all its forms there will be hatred for the West (I do not know if it will be able to differentiate between the positions of the West or whether it will be treated as a single entity) – in addition to the Jews, in a clear confusion between Judaism as a heavenly religion recognized by Muslims, and Zionism as a doctrine. Political.
finally; If both Turkey and Iran give priority to their national interest over supporting the Palestinians, it will reformulate their position on the issue, and will also cast a heavy shadow on the Sunni-Shiite rapprochement that has begun at the official level, but has not yet been confirmed at the popular level.
It is destined for the region that economics will prevail over ideology. Therefore, it is expected that the operations that began during the past three years to break all ties with the latter will be completed, but the adverse winds that were initiated by the “Al-Aqsa Flood” may rethink these issues from two angles: Will the battle of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” give the Islamists the kiss of life again? Or will their structural crisis be unable to benefit from favorable winds, so religious people turn to violent extremism?
There will still be a demand for political Islam in the Middle East – especially among young men and women – but the form it takes will have major implications for regional stability and the balance of power in it, and this requires a new article.
