Related Post
By a clear majority, the Turkish Parliament approved a draft resolution approving Sweden’s membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), opening the door to the alliance before Sweden and Turkish-American relations to questions of repercussions, expected gains, and a possible deal.
The road to NATO
Concerns about the Russian-Ukrainian war pushed Sweden and Finland away from their traditional neutrality, so they submitted a joint application to join NATO, and obtained the approval of all NATO member states except Turkey and Hungary.
For Ankara, the most prominent objection was that the two countries did not effectively combat the activities supporting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party on their territories, and gave official cover to some of these activities, and the failure to cooperate with the Turkish authorities in the file of combating terrorism and extraditing wanted persons, in addition to banning the export of weapons to them. Because of its military operations in northern Syria against the Syrian extensions of the Workers’ Party.
The three countries, Sweden, Finland, and Turkey, formed a tripartite framework to monitor the extent of the two countries’ commitment to Turkish demands. Ankara saw that Helsinki fulfilled its obligations more and faster than Stockholm, so it offered to separate the paths of the two countries from each other. After refusal and reluctance, the two countries and NATO agreed to separate, and Turkey agreed to Finland joining NATO last March.
However, Sweden worked to respond to some Turkish demands later, in terms of cooperation in the files of wanted persons and the extradition of one of them, constitutional and legal amendments regarding the fight against terrorism, and limiting activities supporting the Kurdistan Region on its territory. Although this contributed to softening Ankara’s position, the solution to the problem most likely came through Washington.
Until now, Washington has not finalized the deal, and there has been no real development in Ankara’s European path, but the Turkish-American dialogue has continued
Turkish approval
Despite Turkish reservations, the United States and the NATO General Secretariat reiterated their assessment that Sweden “has fulfilled its obligations” towards Turkey, and that the latter must quickly approve its membership, especially since Hungary had stated that it would agree if Turkey agreed, and would not be a real obstacle to Turkey. Sweden.
There has been a lot of talk behind the scenes in the capital, Ankara, stating that the US administration is pressuring the latter to agree to Stockholm’s accession and links this approval to its conclusion of the F-16 fighter jet deal despite the objection of Congress, which is the alternative deal to the F-35 fighter project from which Turkey was excluded. Because of its purchase of the Russian S-400 system.
The clearest expression of this connection was given by the Turkish President when he said: The United States requires Turkey’s approval of the Sweden file, in exchange for completing the “F-16” deal, and then this matter was reinforced on the sidelines of the NATO summit in Vilnius last July, and after a tripartite summit with NATO Secretary General Stoltberg and Swedish Prime Minister Kristersson, When he announced his agreement to refer the Stockholm file to the alliance to the Turkish Parliament in accordance with an agreement that includes “Sweden’s support for Turkey’s European path.” This has led to an estimate that Turkey and the United States have concluded an understanding that includes Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s file, in exchange for activating its European path and completing the fighter deal.
Until now, Washington has not finalized the deal, and there has been no real development in Ankara’s European path, but the Turkish-American dialogue has continued. After waiting and postponing, for technical reasons related to the work of Parliament as well as the Turkish-American dialogues, the Foreign Policy Committee in Parliament approved the membership file last December and referred the matter to the General Assembly of Parliament.
During the past months, there have been important developments, most notably the “Israeli” aggression against Gaza, which Washington initially tried to ignore Ankara regarding, but then came back and asked it to play some role, which seems to have benefited it relatively. In his last visit to the region, US Secretary of State Blinken began his tour in Ankara, and met with the Turkish President for two hours after a one-on-one meeting with his Turkish counterpart Fidan, and it seems that the Sweden-F-16 complex was resolved in that meeting.
On the 23rd of this month, the Turkish Parliament approved – as expected – by a large majority for Sweden’s membership in NATO, with most of the major parties agreeing to the matter, including the Republican People’s Republic, the largest opposition party. The “Justice and Development Party” and its ally, the “National Movement” with the presidency, and the “Republican People’s Party” were from the beginning against the separation of the tracks of Finland and Sweden, while the “Peoples’ Democracy and Equality Party” (left-wing Kurdish) and the small conservative parties opposed it, as was expected. With the approval of 287 representatives, 55 objections, and 4 abstentions, Sweden and NATO crossed the Turkish obstacle in the membership file.
Outcomes
After the Turkish Parliament’s approval resolved Ankara’s objection to Stockholm’s accession to NATO, attention is turning to the second country objecting to the file, namely Hungary, but this may not be a major challenge, nor even a real one. This is what Hungarian officials had said; They “would not be the last country to agree to Sweden’s membership”; Meaning that they will agree as soon as Ankara announces its approval.
A similar scenario occurred previously, as Hungary announced its approval of Finland’s accession just days after Turkey’s approval. Therefore, Hungary’s relations with Russia or some of its statements that suggest the existence of some conditions will not – in most cases – prevent Sweden from joining, which means that the latter’s membership in NATO is just a matter of time and routine procedural steps.
For NATO, this means an expansion of its area and the extension of its shared borders with Russia, and thus a better negotiating position with the latter, and perhaps a military one if a decision in this direction is taken in the future, and for Sweden it certainly means implicitly better protection pending the practical outcome of the decision in the long term.
The importance of this decision increases for the United States in light of the current “Israeli” war on Gaza, in which it has become largely involved at the expense of its interest in the Russian-Ukrainian war and its developments in the past few months.
However, the most important repercussions of the decision relate to Turkish-American relations at the general level first, and some of their controversial files in particular, specifically American support for Kurdish separatist organizations in Syria, and the F-16 fighter jet deal.
Washington had linked Ankara’s approval to its completion of the deal, which constituted compensation to the latter for the F-35 fighter project. Despite this, Ankara was faced with the rejection of Congress and its requirements and the long procrastination of the US administration.
Indeed, some Turkish sources spoke of a veiled American threat that Turkey’s failure to agree to the Sweden file may not only lead to the disruption of the deal, but also to the American administration concluding an F-35 fighter deal with Greece, which could break American neutrality between the two neighbors and scratch the surface. Relatively, the balance between them. Therefore, Turkey today is counting on the Biden administration to bypass Congress’ position and conclude the deal, as it is understood from Erdogan’s statements that he obtained an American promise in this regard.
As for American support for the Syrian Democratic Forces, it remains a contentious issue pending between the two sides, and it is extremely difficult to reach an agreement that satisfies both parties in the foreseeable future, but Turkey hopes that the American rejection of a military operation it wants and threatens in northern Syria will decline. Its desire for an operation of this type has increased after it recently lost a number of soldiers in operations by the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which – ironically – are operations that many believe came to put pressure on Ankara regarding Sweden’s membership in NATO.
Finally, Turkish approval may help bring about a relative thaw in relations in general with Washington, thus relieving pressure on the economy on the one hand, and on the other hand, the latter’s openness to certain Turkish roles in the region, most notably with regard to Gaza after the end of the war, as Ankara is still calling for the idea of The guarantor countries in the Gaza Strip, and to be among the guarantor countries of the Palestinian party.
But Ankara’s ability to obtain from Washington all or some of what it wants and expects remains question marks, especially since the US administration has actually entered the election atmosphere that is usually characterized by strictness towards Turkey and not the other way around.
