[ad_1]
If you’re a political thinker and doer, the past two years have been a crazy mix of fast and slow: reacting too quickly to cascading crises and upheavals can leave you feeling deadlocked in your tracks when it comes to long-term planning.
Looking to the future, you are entering 2022 and you must have the longer horizon in mind; You want to respond to events around you with an increased focus on the challenges of the future.
Countries in the region will face the age-old gap between capacity and expectations. Citizens expect the state to protect them and provide them – especially the youth – with new opportunities according to international standards, yet they may feel that the state’s only goal is to control them, and this may lead to growing frustration and strengthening the division between the elites and the rest of the people.
The task of any politician in our region now is to manage change whose areas intersect between three components: the state whose borders and roles are being redrawn, the society undergoing profound changes, and geopolitical developments characterized by fluidity, in addition to the three: the need to enrich his understanding of the world around him, and the way in which it is changing , and its place.
The dialectic of the state between power and brutality
Attempts to undermine or supplement the role of states in the region will continue. This is likely to be achieved through efforts to reduce its size and its privileges, through policy packages promoted by international financial institutions that move in the direction of privatization.
The countries of the region have been able to prove to be more resilient than expected. In the future, control of the state will remain the basis, and often the only guarantee, for the survival of the elite.
Countries in the region will face the age-old gap between capacity and expectations. Citizens expect the state to protect them and provide them – especially the youth – with new opportunities according to international standards, yet they may feel that the state’s only goal is to control them, and this may lead to growing frustration and strengthening the division between the elites and the rest of the people.
States may display their power through repression and surveillance, especially if elites feel threatened and fear the demise of power. Savage states will continually learn from each other how to overcome social resentment and curb political opposition, and at the regional level, state elites may seek maximum power.
Strategies that promote state brutality rather than its power may backfire, and undermining the state’s legitimacy may turn it into failure or the failure of its political projects. This situation can be exacerbated by the absence of significant alternative forces, whether at the societal level or at the supranational level. This may also reinforce the demands of secession between the components of the state.
Leadership positions need elites who pay attention to what the average citizen thinks and expects from the state. The presence of strong states will provide the opportunity for some kind of engagement and power-sharing with other actors from society and the private enterprise sector, in the name of shared responsibilities and cooperation in development.
Similar trends can be observed along the vertical axis of center-periphery dynamics, and more clearly between the capital and the most marginalized regions of each country; Which will lead to successful and creative attempts to de-centralize power so that states are closer to their citizens, and to unleash their economic and cultural potential.
Most countries in the region have been strong in terms of a monopoly on the use of violence by governments and securing borders. There have been a few exceptions to this: Lebanon, Yemen, Somalia, and Iraq as of 2003, and those spaces became arenas of competition between regional rivals, and the uprisings of 2011 added several more countries to that list: Syria and Libya, as well as the growth of non-state actors, which is nothing new. Historically, non-state actors have emerged in areas such as Lebanon and Iraq, where the state has been weak.
Therefore, the growth in the number of weak states, along with the increase in regional and international actors willing to patronize them, has led to a similar growth in non-state actors, but has been amplified by its aftermath and influence; The preponderance of non-state actors based on identity politics, when groups took control of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, attach varying degrees of importance to Sunni and Shiite Islam, while Kurdish nationalists still dominate the Kurdish regions of Syria, Iraq, and Turkey.
These shifts combine to present a geopolitical picture that looks very different in the 1920s than it did in the early 2000s before the uprisings: more unstable states, more non-state actors (local, national and transnational) operating within them, and more regional and international powers Prepared to intervene, either by sponsoring local players or deploying their own armies, these structural shifts all make it likely that previously stable arenas will be sucked in.
In conclusion: politics is made from below and at the local level, and it is governed by the network of interactions at all levels, local, national, regional and international, and non-governmental actors in it are now occupying a great deal of weight against the state whose roles and size are being redrawn now and in the future.
Inclusive citizenship
Societal trends in the MENA region will result from the complex interaction between endogenous variables and external factors. Whether the region or parts of it move significantly toward polarization or toward pluralism, it will depend heavily on the choices made by society and political leaders to deal with it.
The attitude towards religion will remain a main driver of societal and political dynamics, and it will remain a highly contentious issue. However, what we must point out in this regard is that dealing with it is witnessing profound transformations, especially among young people, fueled by new cultural and cognitive patterns, based on individualism, benefit, practicality, and the disappearance of reference or focal point…etc.
Fragmentation and the shifts of societies from ideology to pension discourse – based on the priority of people’s standard of life – are likely to shape the religious and secular camps, as well as all societies. .
Citizenship, commitment to diversity, and individual rights can be jeopardized by distinct affiliation and loyalty to core identities, and the political exploitation of long-standing religious and secular discourses may lead to more societal conflicts and competition for control of the leadership of both camps.
manipulating societal divisions in pursuit of regime/elite/group interests; This may clearly lead to the escalation of sectarian divisions.
The creation of lines of exclusion will continue to be a feature of governance and political life, yet it remains unclear where these exclusion lines will be located; Ranging from nationality, race, caste, religion, class, tribe, political affiliation, etc.
Individuality and diversity in all its forms can be a basis for a re-discovery of the concept of diversity citizenship, as the primary driving force for societal development, and an indirect way to heal the wounds of identity conflicts, while collective identities and communication structures are likely to continue to play an enormous role, their potential may be diminished. Polarization within divided societies, if a new focus on individual liberties and rights.
The diverse religious sphere can make religious leaders accountable to common believers. This may contribute to significantly reducing the exploitation of religious discourse, and strengthening the separation between state authority and religious institutions and organizations.
Flexible responses for the future
Perhaps the greatest challenge for any politician in the coming decades is to develop flexible responses to change in 3 key areas that will shape the nature of political life in the coming years: demographics, the economy that will be affected by emerging factors that change its nature, and geopolitics.
According to a UNICEF report, the population of the Middle East will increase dramatically by 2050, from about 500 million in 2020 to 724 million in 30 years. Within this increase, there is a huge bulge in the youth population which puts a certain set of pressures on countries.
The challenges facing some countries are more severe than others. UNICEF estimates that the population of Egypt will grow by 60 million by 2050, while the population of Iraq will increase by 45 million.
The vast majority of those surveyed in the 2020 Arab Opinion Index poll indicated that economic issues were the most pressing problems their countries had to address. 91% of respondents believe that corruption exists in their countries of origin, and some estimates indicate that a trillion dollars have been lost due to corruption over the past fifty years. Corruption has been a major factor in the protests in the region over the past decade.
Economic developments in the future will be affected by new factors that interact with existing structures, resulting in new patterns in the economy.
The 4 emerging factors are:
- Climate changeBy 2050, climate change will be a critical global fact, but its impact will vary from region to region. The countries of the region will be among the most affected: the effects will be felt across the region in the form of severe weather phenomena, heat waves, drought, desertification, severe water shortages, and sea level rise.
One of the most vulnerable areas is the Nile Delta, where a sea level rise of about 50 cm may force 4 million Egyptians to settle in other areas.
Governments and societies in the region will have to contend with scarcity of natural resources, including food, price volatility, and risks associated with new epidemics.
Environmental degradation will magnify the economic and social challenges, especially since this coincides with the marked increase in the population. The ability to anticipate and deal with these challenges will be key to seizing opportunities and facing risks.
- Post-oil worldBy 2050, a post-oil world will prevail as a result of profound changes in the global energy system. Such a system would not arise from a shortage of supply, on the contrary, fossil fuel production could increase for a period of time, thanks to the discovery of new reserves, innovative investments in oil and oil sands, and the popularization of liquefied natural gas. Prices may remain relatively low for some time despite increased supply from emerging economies. But in the long run, the main driver of decarbonization will be giant steps towards technological innovation in the production and storage of renewable energy, and clean energy will be available and popular as a result of global awareness of environmental change. This transformation will be supported by the two fastest growing global powers in the world, namely China and India, and Europe will also invest in this process, and the region will have a large share in this transformation.
- urban expansion area: Our region is characterized by massive urban expansion; 60% of the population was already living in urban areas, and this trend is not expected to change in 2050, when cities in this region will host an additional 130 million people, and therefore will be very crowded. Urban challenges will be especially acute because of the speed of this process, as well as because of diminishing spaces and resources. Environmental degradation may accelerate rural exodus, but cities also have to contend with challenges related to the environment.
And while we were already accustomed to “megacities” like Cairo and Istanbul, there are others that will number more than 10 million people. Baghdad and Khartoum – each with a population of 15 million people – will be two of the largest and rapidly growing cities in the region. They are followed by Tehran (11 million people), then Riyadh and Jeddah (8 million and 7 million people, respectively), and Algeria and Casablanca (5 million people). The capacity of urban areas to adapt to this new reality will depend on the rate of growth, as well as on the resources deployed by local and national authorities to modernize infrastructures such as public transportation, sanitation, etc.
- Digitization and automationExpansion of technology will be one of the global megatrends in 2050. Digitalization will dramatically change economic, social and cultural models, innovation will be the key to successful competition in the global market, and automation and artificial intelligence will fundamentally transform labor markets in most countries. The region will be affected by these trends thanks to the already high (and persistent) unemployment and over-employment rates, especially among the youth.
The changing ability to adapt to economic and technological trends will increase the differences between countries and within each country. While it may be easier for the Gulf region to adapt to these changes, other countries with large workforces, tense labor markets, and inefficient governments may face major social problems.
Political geography.. what’s new?
These aforementioned transformations combine to present a geopolitical picture that appears completely different in the 1920s than it was at the beginning of the decade before the uprisings.
There are more unstable states, more non-state actors (local, national, and transnational) operating within them, and more regional and international powers willing to intervene in these areas, either by sponsoring local players or deploying their own armies.
New drivers of conflict may come to the fore: demographic pressure, rapid urbanization, climate change and natural resource scarcity, the energy transition and its impact on the labor market.
A positive result of the gradual withdrawal of the United States from the Middle East and North Africa region could be that regional powers bear the burden of security. In light of the high cost of the conflict and the danger of being left behind in comparison with the progress of other regions, which may push the regional powers – as we now note – to participate in de-escalation efforts, and to take steps towards a new regional security structure.
“Everything must change to keep everything the same.” This is a quote from a famous Italian book, but it applies to the definition of politics in a region of extreme fluidity, surrounded by a world of uncertainty.
[ad_2]