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Security and defense are trading higher. In just a few weeks, the withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan and the agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States (Aukus) to strengthen military and security capabilities in the Indo-Pacific have reinvigorated the debate on European strategic autonomy and on the most effective alliances for global security. While the American withdrawal and the realignment of forces in the face of the rise of China are increasingly tangible, the EU continues to fail to move from purpose to action in matters of security and defense.
Strategic autonomy, in non-EU language, is the EU’s ability to have the means necessary to achieve its foreign policy objectives, in cooperation with its partners when possible or acting alone if necessary. It is a long-standing debate in European capitals, traditionally limited to the field of defense, but which today is extended to foreign trade, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence or global health.
The need for a greater capacity for autonomous action lies in the realization that the traditional ally and guarantor of European security, the United States, consolidates its turn towards the Pacific, emerges from its role as global police and articulates its foreign policy, on all based on national interests. The rivalry of the United States with China is configured as the central geopolitical element of the 21st century. Despite the incidence of transnational phenomena such as Covid-19 or the climate crises, the world is recovering zero-sum logics, where powers such as China, Russia or India reinforce their status and question the foundations of an international order based on hegemony. western.
The EU, aware of its commercial and regulatory power, lacks its own capabilities in terms of security and defense, and the political will to improve them. While gaining relevance abroad, these capabilities remain fragmented among member states and subordinate to NATO. The persistence of interests, perceptions of threats and different historical trajectories makes it difficult to consolidate a European strategic culture that acts as a nexus for a more geopolitical Europe.
Afghanistan was rightly a source of frustration in the EU. The Doha Agreement between the Trump Administration and the Taliban in 2020 and the unilateral withdrawal without prior consultations by the United States were received like a knife in the back after 20 years of allied intervention. The poor execution of the withdrawal and the lack of diplomatic tact, however, do not hide the fact that Europe was always in the back seat of a Washington-led intervention. The Western presence in Afghanistan had a European flavor, since it included the construction of a rule of law and the protection of human rights as central objectives – and in line with the traditional discourse of European foreign policy. The chaotic end of the Afghan mission reinforces the need for strategic autonomy in the EU, especially when the United States decides to leave the field unilaterally or when, acting under the American umbrella, the Europeans are not able to correct the strategic mistakes made. .
Aukus, on the other hand, does directly challenge the EU and, after her, France, when it comes to developing greater strategic autonomy. The alliance shows that international relations are increasingly articulated around security and defense. Not so much in its classic conception, that is, territorial defense or protection against invasions, but rather global and multisectoral, in which cybersecurity, artificial intelligence or the security of trade routes play a central role.
All these elements, including of course the defense against attacks on submarine digital infrastructure and cables, are part of Aukus (beyond the provision to Australia of nuclear powered submarines, at the expense of its previous contract with France). On the same day the new alliance was announced, Brussels published its Indo-Pacific strategy, replete with references to promoting stability, security, prosperity and sustainable development in this region, but lacking operational security objectives. and defense.
European strategic autonomy is still a narrative purpose with little practical translation. The presidents of the European Council and the Commission strongly condemned what they saw as the second consecutive grievance by Washington, as they studied the unsuccessful request from Paris to delay the Trade and Technology Council between the EU and the United States as a sign of protest. Some Member States, suspicious of the French interpretation of the concept as autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, distanced themselves from feeling the grievance of Paris and showed again that, if such autonomy does not exist, it is due to internal divisions in the EU.
Aukus also exemplifies a major strategic mistake made during the Brexit negotiations. While the negotiators focused on reaching a trade agreement that respected internal market rules and protected peace in Northern Ireland, the EU relegated the strategic relationship with the United Kingdom, its main partner in capacity building, to the background. defense and global presence. For Downing Street, the agreement with the United States and Australia offers the occasion to validate its motto “Global Britain”, While wreaking its own revenge against the iron attitude of the EU and Paris during Brexit. Understanding that the relationship with the United Kingdom only involves economic and commercial stability is a fundamental error in relation to the strategic autonomy of the EU.
Finally, Aukus shows how, in the face of the transformation of the international order, alliances are today more flexible, and complementary to traditional institutional frameworks. The logic “China first“Of American foreign policy goes ahead of loyalty to traditional partners. The “Quad” (strategic dialogue between the United States, India, Japan, and Australia) and the “Five Eyes” (intelligence alliance between Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States) are flexible and focused understandings. China’s growing assertiveness and aggressiveness toward its neighborhood. We Europeans have been too complacent in believing that coalitions between democratic countries, such as the so-called “summit of democracies”, would strengthen the Union. In the eyes of President Joe Biden, the democracies that matter in the face of China’s rise lie beyond Europe. Non-superfluous alliances are those that serve a shared geopolitical interest, and the rise of China worries both the United States and the Indo-Pacific countries.
International stability is about more than trade flows, pandemic or climate crisis. The Afghanistan and Aukus episodes remind us of the importance of security and defense in an increasingly Hobbesian world. For too long, the absence of direct threats has led the EU to drag its feet in developing its own capabilities, even if these are complementary to those of the United States. Today, European strategic autonomy requires facts and political will, both from the point of view of capabilities and alliances with strategic partners. France, as an indispensable actor for European defense after Brexit, must put aside the injury suffered by the Aukus and help build a Europe that, finally, speaks the language of power.
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